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INFORMATIONAL STANDING  
AFTER SUMMERS 
Bradford C. Mank* 
Abstract: In its recent Wilderness Society v. Rey decision, the Ninth Circuit 
addressed the difficult question of when a statute may establish a right to 
informational standing. The decision interpreted the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, and concluded that general 
notice and appeal provisions in a statute that do not establish an explicit 
public right to information from the government are insufficient to estab-
lish informational standing. The Wilderness Society decision indirectly 
raised the broader question of when Congress may modify common law 
injury requirements or even Article III constitutional standing require-
ments. Although the Wilderness Society decision relied on the implications 
of Summers, the Ninth Circuit would have been better advised to examine 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinions in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and 
Summers. His opinions suggest that Congress has significant authority to 
expand citizen suit standing as long as it carefully defines the statutory in-
juries it seeks to remedy. Wilderness Society is important because it is the 
first court of appeals decision that attempts to reconcile Summers and FEC 
v. Akins, the crucial informational standing case. Although the result in 
Wilderness Society may be correct, the Ninth Circuit failed to grasp the full 
complexities of the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence. This Article 
argues how to best interpret Lujan, Summers, and Akins in determining 
how much authority Congress has to establish informational standing and 
other standing rights that have divided lower federal courts. 
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author presented an early version of this Article at the Environmental Scholarship Sympo-
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Introduction1 
 In its recent decision, Wilderness Society v. Rey, the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed the difficult question of when a statute may establish a right to 
informational standing.2 The D.C. Circuit and the Sixth Circuit had 
previously reached different conclusions about whether environmental 
statutes promoting public participation or requiring environmental 
assessments in certain circumstances create a right to informational 
standing.3 The Ninth Circuit’s decision interpreted the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Summers v. Earth Island Institute 4—which explicitly 
narrowed procedural rights standing—as implicitly narrowing standing 
rights in general.5 The Wilderness Society decision concluded that gen-
eral notice and appeal provisions in a statute that are designed to pro-
mote public participation, but do not establish an explicit public right 
to information from the government, are insufficient to establish in-
formational standing.6 
 The decision in Wilderness Society indirectly raised the broader 
question of when Congress may modify common law injury require-
ments, or even Article III constitutional standing requirements for a 
concrete injury.7 That question in turn raises broader separation of 
powers questions.8 Although Wilderness Society relied on the implica-
tions of Summers to limit informational standing, the Ninth Circuit 
would have been better advised to examine Justice Kennedy’s concur-
                                                                                                                      
1 This Article is one of a series of explorations of possible extensions of modern stand-
ing doctrines. The other pieces are: (1) Bradford Mank, Revisiting the Lyons Den: Summers 
v. Earth Island Institute’s Misuse of Lyons’s “Realistic Threat” of Harm Standing Test, 42 Ariz. 
St. L.J. 837 (2010); (2) Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than 
Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 1701 (2008) [hereinafter Mank, States Standing]; (3) Bradford C. Mank, Standing and 
Future Generations: Does Massachusetts v. EPA Open Standing for Generations to Come?, 34 
Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Mank, Standing and Future Generations]; (4) 
Bradford Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons: A Risk-Based Approach to Standing, 36 Ecol-
ogy L.Q. 665 (2009) [hereinafter Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons]; (5) Bradford C. 
Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute: Its Implications for Future Standing Decisions, 40 
Envtl. L. Rep. 10,958 (2010) [hereinafter Mank, Implications for Future Standing Decisions]; 
(6) Bradford Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute Rejects Probabilistic Standing, but a 
“Realistic Threat” of Harm Is a Better Standing Test, 40 Envtl. L. 89 (2010) 
2 622 F.3d 1251, 1257–60 (9th Cir. 2010). 
3 Compare infra notes 200–237 and accompanying text, with infra notes 238–299 and ac-
companying text. 
4 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009). 
5 See infra notes 300–354 and accompanying text. 
6 622 F.3d at 1259. 
7 See infra notes 362–394 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 36–48, 145–150, 362–394 and accompanying text. 
2012] Informational Standing After Summers 3 
ring opinions in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and Summers as a guide to 
the Supreme Court’s approach to when Congress may confer standing 
rights.9 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinions suggest that Congress 
has significant authority to expand citizen suit standing as long as it 
carefully defines the statutory injuries it seeks to remedy through such 
suits.10 
 The Supreme Court’s standing requirements are confusing be-
cause its decisions have oscillated between relatively liberal and restric-
tive approaches to defining the types of injuries sufficient under Article 
III of the Constitution.11 Justice Scalia proposed a restrictive approach 
to standing because he believes that it is a “crucial and inseparable 
element” of the constitutional separation-of-powers principle, and that 
limiting standing rules reduces judicial interference with the democ-
ratically elected legislative and executive branches.12 In response, his 
critics argue that he is more concerned with protecting executive 
branch decisions from lawsuits than protecting congressional preroga-
tives.13 The Lujan Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, interpreted 
standing doctrine to require a party to show “an injury-in-fact,” which is 
“concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural 
or hypothetical.”14 In footnote seven of Lujan, however, the Court cre-
ated an exception to its otherwise narrow approach to standing by ob-
                                                                                                                      
9 See infra notes 362–415 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 362–415 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 36–92 and accompanying text (discussing Article III standing re-
quirements and, in particular, what is a sufficient “injury-in-fact” for standing). 
12 Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 
Envtl. L. 1, 29 (2005) (discussing and criticizing Justice Scalia’s 1983 standing article) [here-
inafter Mank, Global Warming]; Robert V. Percival, “Greening” the Constitution—Harmonizing 
Environmental and Constitutional Values, 32 Envtl. L. 809, 847 (2002) (discussing and criticiz-
ing Justice Scalia’s 1983 standing article); see Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an 
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 881 (1983); see also 
Larry W. Yackle, Federal Courts 332–35 (3d ed. 2009) (examining Justice Scalia’s ap-
proach to standing and the consequences of his argument). 
13 See Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 602 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
“principal effect” of Justice Scalia’s restrictive approach to standing was “to transfer power 
into the hands of the Executive at the expense—not of the courts—but of Congress, from 
which that power originates and emanates”); Kimberly N. Brown, Justiciable Generalized 
Grievances, 68 Md. L. Rev. 221, 283 (2008) (“If Justice Scalia is correct, and standing should 
strictly operate to shield the executive from judicial review notwithstanding congressional 
intent, laws passed by a democratically elected branch could simply go unenforced.”); 
Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 
1023, 1050 (2009) (“With respect to the argument that a broad reading of Article III stand-
ing improperly limits executive power under Article II, some scholars contend that it does 
not give sufficient weight to the balance, as opposed to the separation, of powers.”). 
14 504 U.S. at 560 (citations omitted); Mank, Global Warming, supra note 12, at 23–24. 
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serving that plaintiffs who may suffer a concrete injury resulting from a 
procedural violation by the government are entitled to a more relaxed 
application of both the imminent injury and the redressability standing 
requirements.15 Justice Kennedy, who has often been the swing vote in 
standing cases, wrote a concurring opinion in Lujan arguing that Con-
gress may use its legislative authority to go beyond common law princi-
ples in defining a concrete injury, although he acknowledged that 
Congress did not have the authority to eliminate the concrete injury 
requirement of Article III.16 
 In Federal Election Commission v. Akins, Justice Breyer, joined by five 
other justices including Justice Kennedy, endorsed informational inju-
ries as potentially sufficient for standing.17 The Court held that the 
plaintiff voters suffered a “concrete and particular” injury in fact suffi-
cient for Article III standing because they were deprived of the statutory 
right to receive designated “information [which] would help them . . . 
to evaluate candidates for public office” —despite the fact that many 
other voters shared the same informational injury.18 Justice Scalia wrote 
a dissenting opinion, joined by two other justices, arguing that the plain-
tiffs did not have standing because their injury was common to the pub-
lic at large and did not cause them a particularized injury.19 
 Both before and after Akins, lower court decisions have been di-
vided when plaintiffs in environmental cases seek standing based on an 
alleged informational injury resulting from the government or a pri-
vate defendant’s failure to provide information regarding their envi-
ronmental impacts.20 Before Akins, in Foundation on Economic Trends v. 
Lyng, the D.C. Circuit questioned, but did not decide, whether infor-
mational injury alone can meet the Article III injury in fact require-
ment.21 By contrast, citing Akins, a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit in 
American Canoe Ass’n v. City of Louisa Water & Sewer Commission con-
cluded that environmental groups had standing to seek information 
                                                                                                                      
15 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; see Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1716–20; Mank, 
Global Warming, supra note 12, at 35–36. 
16 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); see Mank, Global Warming, supra note 12, at 34–35. 
17 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998). 
18 Id. at 21, 23–25; see Mank, Global Warming, supra note 12, at 37–38. 
19 Akins, 524 U.S. at 29, 33–37 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Mank, Global Warming, supra 
note 12, at 38–40. 
20 See infra notes 196–355 and accompanying text. 
21 943 F.2d 79, 84–85 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also Akins, 524 U.S. at 11; Am. Canoe Ass’n v. 
City of Louisa Water & Sewer Comm’n, 389 F.3d 536, 547–48 (6th Cir. 2004) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (dis-
cussing Lyng’s criticism of informational standing). 
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about water pollution issues pursuant to the citizen suit provision of the 
Clean Water Act, if it would assist their members’ understanding of pol-
lution issues and legislative proposals.22 
 In Summers, the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision written 
by Justice Scalia, adopted a restrictive approach to standing that re-
quires plaintiffs to prove how they are concretely injured, or will be 
imminently injured, by the government’s allegedly illegal actions.23 
This opinion rejected Justice Breyer’s proposed test for organizational 
standing based upon the statistical probability that some of an organi-
zation’s members will likely be harmed in the near future.24 The Court 
held that the plaintiff organizations failed to establish that they would 
suffer an “imminent” injury necessary for standing because they could 
not prove the specific places and times when their members would be 
harmed by the government’s allegedly illegal policy of selling fire-
damaged timber without public notice and comment.25 By emphasizing 
that plaintiffs must demonstrate an imminent injury even for proce-
dural rights, the Summers decision implicitly overruled previous deci-
sions that had relaxed the imminence requirement for standing in pro-
cedural rights cases.26 Justice Kennedy, however, wrote a concurring 
opinion in Summers that echoed his opinion in Lujan—while plaintiffs 
had failed to prove a concrete injury, Congress could provide a broader 
statutory definition of what constitutes a “concrete” injury for similar 
plaintiffs in the future.27 
 In Wilderness Society, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Summers and 
Akins to implicitly restrict the scope of informational standing to stat-
utes that give plaintiffs an explicit right to information from the gov-
ernment.28 The court reasoned that Akins’s support for informational 
standing was limited to statutes that explicitly give the public the right 
to particular information from the government.29 Conversely, if an en-
vironmental statute only seeks to encourage public participation and 
does not provide a right to information about certain types of govern-
                                                                                                                      
22 389 F.3d at 544–47. 
23 See 555 U.S. at 495–97. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Id. at 489. Justice Breyer’s dissenting 
opinion was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id. at 501. 
24 Id. at 496–500 (majority opinion). 
25 Id. at 490–96. 
26 Compare infra notes 49–57 and accompanying text with infra notes 160–176 and ac-
companying text. 
27 See infra notes 178–181 and accompanying text. 
28 Wilderness Soc’y, 622 F.3d at 1259. 
29 Id. 
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ment projects, such a statute should be read narrowly in light of Sum-
mers.30 Otherwise, a broad doctrine of informational standing would 
allow plaintiffs to bypass Summers’s conclusion that procedural injury 
alone does not provide standing, unless it is attached to a particular 
project or if the procedural injury results in informational harm.31 
 Although the Supreme Court generally tightened standing re-
quirements in Lujan and Summers, the Akins decision nonetheless left 
open the possibility of broad informational standing.32 The Ninth Cir-
cuit’s decision in Wilderness Society is important because it is the first 
court of appeals decision that attempts to reconcile Summers and 
Akins.33 The result in Wilderness Society—that Congress must explicitly 
establish informational standing rights—may be correct, but the Ninth 
Circuit failed to grasp the full complexities of the Supreme Court’s 
standing jurisprudence by focusing only on how Summers might limit 
Akins.34 Because he was the key swing vote in Lujan and Summers and 
was a member of the Akins majority, Justice Kennedy’s analysis of stand-
ing issues is crucial to understanding the Supreme Court’s standing 
jurisprudence.35 This Article argues how to best interpret Lujan, Sum-
mers, and Akins in determining how much authority Congress has to 
establish informational standing and other standing rights issues that 
have divided lower federal courts. 
 Part I provides an introduction to standing doctrine. Part II dis-
cusses the Supreme Court’s informational standing decisions in Public 
Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice and Akins. Part III examines the Sum-
mers decision. Part IV explicates conflicting decisions on informational 
standing in the D.C. Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and most recently the Ninth 
Circuit decision. Part V uses Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in 
Lujan to propose a framework for courts to assess Congress’s authority 
to grant standing rights in general, and informational standing rights 
in particular. 
                                                                                                                      
30 See id. at 1259–60. 
31 Id. at 1260. 
32 See infra notes 119–144, 151–176 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 300–354 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 362–394 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 119–144, 178–181, 362–415 and accompanying text. 
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I. Standing Doctrine 
A. Constitutional and Prudential Standing 
 Although the Constitution does not explicitly require that a plain-
tiff have standing to file suit in federal courts, since 1944 the Supreme 
Court has inferred from the Constitution’s Article III limitation of judi-
cial decisions to “Cases” and to “Controversies” that federal courts must 
utilize standing requirements to guarantee that the plaintiff has a genu-
ine interest and stake in a case.36 Federal courts only have jurisdiction 
over a case if a plaintiff has standing for the relief sought.37 If the plain-
tiff fails to meet constitutional standing requirements, a federal court 
will dismiss the case without deciding the merits.38 
 Standing requirements derive from broad constitutional princi-
ples,39 and prohibit unconstitutional advisory opinions.40 Furthermore, 
standing supports separation of powers principles—defining the divi-
sion of powers between the judiciary and political branches of govern-
                                                                                                                      
36See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and . . . to 
Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; 
between Citizens of different States . . . .” Id. See also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 
U.S. 332, 340–42 (2006) (explaining why the Supreme Court infers that the Article III case 
and controversy requirement necessitates standing limitations); Ryan Guilds, A Jurispru-
dence of Doubt: Generalized Grievances as a Limitation to Federal Court Access, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 
1863, 1868–71 (1996) (discussing rationales for standing jurisprudence and citing Stark v. 
Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944), as the first time the Article III standing requirement was 
referenced); Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1709–10; Mank, Standing and Statistical 
Persons, note 1, at 673. But see Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, 
“Injuries,” and Article III, 91 Mich L. Rev. 163, 168–79 (1992) (arguing that framers of the 
Constitution did not intend Article III to require standing). See generally Solimine, supra 
note 13, at 1036–38 (discussing debate on whether the Constitution implicitly requires 
standing to sue). 
37 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) 
(“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.”); Mank, 
States Standing, supra note 1, at 1710; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 
673; see DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351–54. Standing is one factor in determining whether a 
suit is legitimately justiciable in court. See, e.g., Jeremy Gaston, Note, Standing on Its Head: The 
Problem of Future Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 219 (1998). 
“[R]ipeness, mootness, advisory opinions, and political questions” are other factors in de-
termining justiciability. Id. 
38 See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 340–46; Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180 (“[W]e 
have an obligation to assure ourselves that [petitioner] had Article III standing at the out-
set of the litigation.”); Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1710; Mank, Standing and 
Statistical Persons, supra note 1. 
39 See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 340–42; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra 
note 1, at 673. 
40 See, e.g., Gaston, supra note 37, at 219. 
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ment so that the “Federal Judiciary respects ‘the proper—and properly 
limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.’”41 There is, how-
ever, disagreement as to what extent the principle of separation of 
powers limits the standing of suits challenging alleged executive branch 
under or non-enforcement of congressional requirements mandated by 
statute.42 In Lujan for example, Justice Scalia reasoned that allowing 
any person to sue the U.S. government to challenge its alleged failure 
to enforce the law would improperly interfere with the President’s Arti-
cle II constitutional authority to “‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed . . . .’”43 Some commentators have argued that Justice Scalia’s 
approach to standing undermines the role of Congress in using judicial 
review to guarantee that the executive branch obeys enacted laws.44 
 In addition to constitutional Article III standing requirements, 
federal courts may impose prudential standing requirements to restrict 
unreasonable demands on limited judicial resources or for other policy 
reasons.45 Congress may enact legislation to override prudential limita-
tions but must “expressly negate[]” such limitations.46 The Supreme 
Court has been unclear regarding whether its restriction on suits alleg-
                                                                                                                      
41 DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 341 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)); 
Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1709–10; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra 
note 1, at 679; see Scalia, supra note 12, at 881, 896. 
42 See Scalia, supra note 12, at 881–82 (arguing for restrictive standing, thereby limiting 
the role of the judiciary). But see Lujan 504 U.S. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (The “prin-
cipal effect” of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion’s restrictive approach to standing was “to 
transfer power into the hands of the Executive at the expense—not of the Courts—but of 
Congress, from which that power originates and emanates.”). 
43 Lujan, at 504 U.S. at 577 (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 3). Justice Scalia acknowl-
edged that Congress may “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de 
facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.” Id. at 578. 
44 See Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 459, 496 (2008) (argu-
ing courts should not use standing doctrine “as a backdoor way to limit Congress’s legisla-
tive power”); infra notes 365–401 and accompanying text (discussing broad standing rights 
as means to protect congressional authority to ensure that the executive branch enforces 
federal laws). 
45 See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162–63 (1997) (describing the “zone of in-
terests” standard as a prudential limitation rather than a mandatory constitutional re-
quirement); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (stating that prudential requirements 
are based “in policy, rather than purely constitutional, considerations”); Yackle, supra note 
12, at 318 (stating that prudential limitations are policy-based “and may be relaxed in 
some circumstances”). 
46 Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163. Unlike constitutional standing, prudential limits on stand-
ing “can be modified or abrogated by Congress.” Id. at 162. Prudential limitations are 
judge-made and must be “expressly negated.” Id. at 163. Furthermore, citizen suit provi-
sions abrogate the zone of interest limitation. Id. at 166. 
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ing “generalized grievances”47—a term used to refer to suits involving 
large segments of the public, or those where a citizen lacking a per-
sonal injury seeks to force the government to obey a duly enacted law— 
is a prudential or constitutional limitation.48 
B. The Injury Requirement 
 In Lujan, the Court summarized and refined its three-part standing 
test.49 First, a plaintiff must show “an injury-in-fact” that is “concrete and 
particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypotheti-
cal.”50 Next, the plaintiff must also show “a causal connection between 
the injury and the conduct complained of,” directly linking the injury to 
the challenged action of the defendant.51 Finally, the injury must be 
likely, rather than speculatively, redressable by the court.52 A plaintiff 
has the burden of establishing all three parts of the standing test.53 
                                                                                                                     
 This Article will focus primarily on the injury requirement for 
standing. In Lujan, the majority concluded that the plaintiff, Defenders 
of Wildlife, lacked standing to challenge the failure of certain govern-
ment agencies to consult with the Secretary of Interior about funding 
projects that might hurt endangered species in foreign countries.54 The 
court found that the plaintiff lacked standing because the two members 
of the organization who filed affidavits only had intentions to visit the 
relevant foreign countries—Egypt and Sri Lanka—at some indetermi-
nate future date.55 The Court concluded, “[s]uch ‘some day’ inten-
tions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any 
specification of when the some day will be—do not support a finding of 
 
47 Guilds, supra note 36, at 1884 (“Beyond the uncertainty about whether generalized 
grievances are constitutional or prudential limitations, there is also uncertainty about their 
precise definition.”); see Yackle, supra note 12, at 342 (“The ‘generalized grievance’ for-
mulation is notoriously ambiguous.”). 
48 See Yackle, supra note 12, at 342–49 (discussing the Supreme Court debate on whether 
the rule against generalized grievances is a constitutional rule or a non-constitutional policy 
waivable by Congress); Guilds, supra note 36, at 1878; Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 
1710–16. 
49 See 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 560. 
53 Id. at 561 (stating that “[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of 
establishing these elements”); see DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342 (stating that parties assert-
ing federal jurisdiction must “carry the burden of establishing their standing under Article 
III”); Yackle, supra note 12, at 336. 
54 504 U.S. at 557–59, 578. 
55 Id. at 562–64. 
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an ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.”56 Similarly, in 
Summers, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion concluded that the plaintiff 
organizations failed to demonstrate a concrete injury because they 
could not specify precise times and locations when their members 
would visit national parks where the U.S. Forest Service was allegedly 
engaged in illegal salvage timber sales.57 
C. Relaxed Standing in Procedural Cases 
 In cases involving procedural violations, such as the failure of the 
government to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) pur-
suant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),58 courts relax 
the imminence and redressability portions of the standing test.59 The 
Summers decision, however, may suggest that the Court is retrenching its 
relaxation of the imminence requirement.60 In footnote seven of 
Lujan, Justice Scalia stated that plaintiffs who may suffer a concrete in-
jury resulting from the government’s procedural error are entitled to a 
more relaxed application of these standing requirements because 
remedying the procedural violation may not change the government’s 
substantive decision.61 Justice Scalia offered the prototypical example 
of procedural injury to a plaintiff who lives near a proposed dam who 
seeks an environmental assessment under NEPA to study its potential 
impacts.62 He stated: 
                                                                                                                     
There is this much truth to the assertion that “procedural 
rights” are special: The person who has been accorded a pro-
cedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that 
right without meeting all the normal standards for redress-
ability and immediacy. Thus, under our case law, one living 
adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a federally li-
censed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency’s 
 
56 Id. at 564. 
57 555 U.S. at 493–97. 
58 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006). 
59 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. 
60 See Summers, 555 U.S. at 498–99; Brown, supra note 13, at 257–64 (discussing the 
Court’s leniency in deciding standing in cases involving procedural violations). A plaintiff 
must still allege that the proposed government action would have some possibility of caus-
ing a concrete harm. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. The Supreme Court has never clearly 
explained to what extent the immediacy or redressability portions of the standing test are 
relaxed in procedural rights cases. Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1719. 
61 See 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. 
62 Id.; see Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1716; Mank, Global Warming, supra note 
12, at 35–36. 
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failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even 
though he cannot establish with any certainty that the state-
ment will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even 
though the dam will not be completed for many years.63 
Justice Scalia limited standing in this example to plaintiffs with con-
crete injuries resulting from the government’s procedural error.64 Fur-
thermore, “persons who live (and propose to live) at the other end of 
the country from the dam” do not have “concrete interests affected” 
and thus do not have standing to challenge such a violation.65 
 A plaintiff normally must establish standing by showing it is likely 
that they will suffer a concrete injury from actions traceable to the de-
fendant, and that injury could be redressed by a favorable judicial deci-
sion.66 A plaintiff, however, claiming government procedural error 
need not prove that the government’s actions will cause imminent 
harm, or that a judicial remedy will actually prevent the government 
from taking the proposed action.67 For example, a NEPA plaintiff is 
entitled to a remedy mandating that the government follow NEPA’s 
procedural requirement of conducting an EIS, even if it is uncertain 
that it will lead the government to change its substantive decision.68 
                                                                                                                     
 In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court arguably adopted an even more 
relaxed approach to redressability for procedural rights plaintiffs than 
that suggested in footnote seven of Lujan.69 The decision declared that 
procedural rights litigants need only demonstrate “some possibility” that 
their requested remedy would redress a procedural injury.70 Illustrating 
the volatility of the Court’s position on standing, the four dissenting jus-
 
63 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; see Mank, Global Warming, supra note 12, at 35–36, 35 
n.240 (discussing relaxed standing requirements for procedural injures); Blake R. 
Bertagna, Comment, “Standing” Up for the Environment: The Ability of Plaintiffs to Establish 
Legal Standing to Redress Injuries Caused by Global Warming, 2006 BYU L. Rev. 415, 457 (dis-
cussing relaxed standing requirements for procedural injuries). 
64 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. 
65 Id.; see id. at 573 n.8 (“We do not hold that an individual cannot enforce procedural 
rights; he assuredly can, so long as the procedures in question are designed to protect 
some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing.”); Wil-
liam W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 247, 257 
(2001); Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1716. 
66 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
67 See id. at 572 n.7; Mank, Global Warming, supra note 12, at 35–36, 35 n.240, 36 n.244. 
68 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; Mank, Global Warming, supra note 12, at 35–36. 
69 See 549 U.S. 497, 501, 525–26 (2007). 
70 Id. at 518 (“When a litigant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant has stand-
ing if there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party 
to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.”). 
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tices in Massachusetts v. EPA—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Alito—were in the Summers majority two years later, while 
four of the justices in the Massachusetts v. EPA majority—Justices Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer—dissented in Summers.71 Justice Kennedy 
was the only justice in the majority in both cases, thus demonstrating 
that he is the key vote in standing cases.72 In Massachusetts v. EPA, the 
Court rejected the argument by the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) that petitioners must prove that federal courts could remedy the 
global problem of climate change.73 Instead, the Court determined that 
petitioners satisfied the redressability portion of the standing test be-
cause a court order requiring the EPA to regulate emissions from new 
vehicles will “slow or reduce” global climate change.74 The decision’s 
“some possibility” test appears to be applicable to all procedural rights 
plaintiffs.75 The Summers decision did not address Massachusetts v. EPA’s 
relaxed approach to redressability for procedural rights plaintiffs, but it 
may have tightened the imminence requirement.76 
 Typical of much of the Supreme Court’s imprecise standing juris-
prudence, footnote seven of Lujan does not clearly explain the degree 
to which the immediacy and redressability requirements are waived or 
relaxed in procedural rights cases, the plaintiff’s burden of proof to 
establish standing in procedural rights cases, or how to define proce-
dural rights.77 As a result, what plaintiffs must show regarding their like-
                                                                                                                      
71 Compare Summers, 555 U.S. at 488 (2009) (listing majority and dissenting members), 
with Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 501 (listing majority and dissenting members). 
72 Compare Summers, 555 U.S. at 488 (listing majority and dissenting members); with 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 501 (listing majority and dissenting members). 
73 See 549 U.S. at 525. 
74 Id.; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 675. 
75 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518; Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1727 
(arguing the “some possibility” standard in Massachusetts v. EPA applies to all procedural 
plaintiffs). 
76 See infra notes 200–237 and accompanying text. 
77 See Brian J. Gatchel, Informational and Procedural Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 11 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 75, 99–105 (1995) (criticizing footnote seven in 
Lujan for failing to explain to what extent immediacy and redressability standing require-
ments are relaxed or eliminated); Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1718–20 (criticiz-
ing the Court’s lack of guidance on how to apply footnote seven in Lujan); Mank, Global 
Warming, supra note 12, at 36–37, 36 n.244 (“[F]ootnote seven does not clearly explain the 
extent to which redressability and immediacy requirements are waived in procedural rights 
cases.”); Sunstein, supra note 36, at 208 (“The Court acknowledged (without any real ex-
pansion) that in some cases involving procedural violations, plaintiffs need not show re-
dressability.”); Christopher T. Burt, Comment, Procedural Injury Standing After Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 275, 285 (1995) (“Lujan’s procedural injury dicta is 
not without its problems, however. At best, it is vague and provides little guidance for pro-
spective plaintiffs and the lower courts . . . .”). 
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lihood of harm arising from the agency’s action is unclear.78 For exam-
ple, the D.C. Circuit employs a strict “substantial probability” test, but 
the Ninth Circuit utilizes a more lenient “reasonable probability” test.79 
The Supreme Court could have prevented confusion in lower courts by 
eliminating the immediacy requirement for procedural rights plaintiffs 
as they have no control over how quickly the government will act, but 
the Lujan decision does not address the issue of timing.80 Additionally, 
footnote seven does not provide clear guidance as to what extent courts 
can relax or eliminate the redressability requirement.81 Yet, the subse-
quent Massachusetts v. EPA decision appears to adopt a relaxed ap-
proach to the redressability requirement in procedural rights cases.82 
D. Threatened and Imminent Injuries 
 In some cases, a threatened injury may be sufficiently concrete and 
imminent if the harm is likely to occur in the relatively near future, al-
though the Supreme Court has never precisely defined “imminent in-
jury.”83 In Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, the Court stated 
“[o]ne does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury 
to obtain preventive relief. If the injury is certainly impending that is 
                                                                                                                      
78 Compare Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 665–72 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (apply-
ing a strict four-part test for standing in a procedural rights case, including requiring a 
procedural rights plaintiff to demonstrate a particularized injury, that “a particularized 
environmental interest of theirs [] will suffer demonstrably increased risk,” and that it is 
“substantially probable” that the agency action will cause the demonstrable injury alleged), 
with Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 972 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(rejecting Florida Audubon’s standing test for procedural rights plaintiffs and stating that 
such plaintiffs must show “the reasonable probability of the challenged action’s threat to 
[their] concrete interest”) (quoting Churchill Cnty. v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th 
Cir. 1998)), and Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 451–52 (10th Cir. 
1996) (disagreeing with Florida Audubon’s “substantial probability” test for procedural 
rights plaintiffs and instead adopting a test requiring plaintiff to establish an “increased 
risk of adverse environmental consequences” from the alleged failure to follow NEPA). See 
generally Mank, Global Warming, supra note 12, at 45–63. 
79 Compare Fla. Audubon, 94 F.3d at 665–72 (applying a substantial probability test), with 
Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 972 (applying a reasonable probability test). 
80 See Gatchel, supra note 77, at 93–94, 99–100; Douglas Sinor, Tenth Circuit Survey: En-
vironmental Law, 75 Denv. U. L. Rev. 859, 880 (1998). 
81 See Gatchel, supra note 77, at 100, 108; Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1719; 
Sinor, supra note 80, at 879 (criticizing footnote seven because it “is confusing and raises 
more questions than it answers”). 
82See 549 U.S. at 518. 
83 See Mank, Standing and Future Generations, supra note 1, at 39; Mank, Standing and Sta-
tistical Persons, supra note 1, at 684. 
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enough.”84 Lujan’s approach to “imminent injury” is similar to Babbitt’s 
approach to threatened injuries.85 The imminent injury test, however, 
fails to define a sufficient probability of risk to a plaintiff and how 
quickly injury must result.86 For instance, the Ninth Circuit has inter-
preted the imminent standing test to require an increased risk of 
harm.87 The subsequent Summers decision arguably overruled the 
Ninth Circuit’s approach to the imminence test by requiring plaintiffs 
to demonstrate when and where they would be injured in the future.88 
                                                                                                                     
E. Oscillating Standing Requirements 
 The Court has oscillated between relatively strict and lenient stand-
ing requirements. Lujan adopted a relatively strict definition of concrete 
injury, but footnote seven allowed a more lenient standard for plaintiffs 
in procedural rights cases to meet the imminence and redressability re-
quirements for standing.89 Massachusetts v. EPA appeared to relax the 
redressability standard for procedural rights plaintiffs.90 Yet just two 
years later, Summers arguably narrowed procedural standing in regard to 
the imminence standard.91 The Court’s confusing standing jurispru-
dence results from profound philosophical disagreements among the 
justices on the Court.92 
 
84 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 
(1923)); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (reasoning that a threatened injury may satisfy standing re-
quirements); Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) (requiring a 
plaintiff to have “suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal 
conduct of the defendant”); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 
F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“The Supreme Court has consistently recognized 
that threatened rather than actual injury can satisfy Article III standing requirements.”). 
85 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–64; Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298. 
86 Mank, Standing and Future Generations, supra note 1, at 39; see Mank, Standing and Sta-
tistical Persons, supra note 1, at 684. 
87 See Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000). 
88 See 555 U.S. at 498–99; infra notes 160–176 and accompanying text. 
89 See supra notes 36–57 and accompanying text. 
90 See 549 U.S. at 518; supra notes 49–57 and accompanying text. 
91 See 555 U.S. at 498–501; infra notes 160–176 and accompanying text. 
92 See infra notes 119–144, 160–195 and accompanying text. 
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II. Informational Standing: Public Citizen and Akins 
A. Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice: Endorsing Pure 
Informational Standing 
 In Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, the Supreme Court en-
dorsed the concept of pure informational standing but did not discuss 
the issue at length.93 Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration of 
the case, and perhaps his absence is the reason for the lack of such dis-
cussion.94 For many years, the American Bar Association’s Standing 
Committee on the Federal Judiciary (ABA Committee) provided advice 
to the President on the nomination of federal judges.95 The Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (FACA) imposes a number of requirements96 
on committees or similar groups that advise the President or federal 
agencies.97 The plaintiff filed suit requesting both a declaration that 
the Justice Department’s utilization of the ABA Committee was covered 
by FACA and an order mandating the Justice Department to comply 
with FACA’s requirements.98 
                                                                                                                     
 Justice Brennan’s majority opinion concluded that the ABA Com-
mittee did not constitute an “advisory committee” for purposes of 
FACA.99 FACA’s legislative history indicated that Congress did not in-
tend to apply the term “utilize” in the statute to the advisory relation-
ship between the Justice Department and the ABA Committee.100 The 
majority acknowledged that it avoided interpreting FACA to apply to 
the ABA Committee in part because such an interpretation would raise 
serious constitutional concerns regarding whether FACA unduly in-
fringed on the President’s constitutional power to nominate federal 
judges and thus violated the doctrine of separation of powers.101 In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice O’Connor, applied a “plain language” construction of the 
statute in reasoning that FACA included the ABA Committee’s activities 
 
93 491 U.S. 440, 449–50 (1989). 
94 See id. at 442. 
95 Id. at 443–45. 
96 These requirements include the public availability of records consistent with the 
Freedom of Information Act’s public information requirements and exemptions. See 5 
U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
97 See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 445–47. 
98 Id. at 447. 
99 Id. at 463–65. 
100 See id. at 451–65. 
101 See U.S. Const. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2; Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 465–67. 
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when advising the Justice Department on such matters.102 But Justice 
Kennedy ultimately concluded that the application of FACA to the 
President’s use of the ABA Committee was unconstitutional because it 
violated Article II’s appointments clause by interfering with the Presi-
dent’s ability to gather information about potential judicial nomi-
nees.103 
 Most relevant for this Article, the ABA argued that the plaintiffs 
lacked standing because they failed to allege an “injury sufficiently con-
crete and specific” since they “advanced a general grievance shared in 
substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens . . . .”104 Fol-
lowing its decisions relating to informational standing under the Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA), the Court concluded that the plain-
tiffs had standing to seek information pursuant to FACA’s statutory 
mandates.105 The Court reasoned that prohibiting the appellant from 
studying the ABA Committee’s activities is comparable to a denial of 
information under FOIA.106 The Court’s interpretation of FOIA never 
required more than a showing that the information requested was de-
nied.107 Thus, a refusal to grant information under FACA, like a refusal 
to grant information under FOIA, constitutes a distinct injury and af-
fords standing to sue.108 
 The Court rejected the ABA’s argument that the plaintiffs did not 
have standing because they alleged a generalized grievance.109 The 
Court found that it was not reason enough to deny the appellants their 
asserted injury solely because other citizens or groups of citizens may 
also claim the same injury.110 Similarly, FOIA is not restricted by the 
fact that many citizens might request the same information under its 
authority.111 
                                                                                                                     
 The court in Public Citizen did not attempt to reconcile its approval 
of standing in FACA suits with its recognition of standing in FOIA cases, 
or with other decisions that questioned standing in circumstances 
 
102 See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 467–89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment). 
103 Id. at 481–89; see U.S. Const. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2. 
104 See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 448–49 (majority opinion). 
105 See id. at 449. 
106 See id. 
107 Id. 
108 See id. 
109 See id. at 449–50. 
110 See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449–50. 
111 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006); Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449–50. 
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where a plaintiff asserted a generalized grievance.112 In Duke Power Co. 
v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., for example, the Supreme 
Court held that a court could deny standing in a suit involving general-
ized harms because such a suit would raise “general prudential con-
cerns ‘about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a 
democratic society.’”113 Public Citizen’s approach to informational stand-
ing—allowing any citizen to seek information under FACA—is arguably 
inconsistent with Duke Power’s restrictive approach to generalized griev-
ances, but Public Citizen did not discuss that case.114 One problem typi-
cal of standing jurisprudence is that the Court has never precisely de-
fined the term “generalized grievance” and whether its prohibition is a 
flexible judicial prudential doctrine or a firmer constitutional rule.115 
As a result, it is difficult to decide whether the decisions in Public Citizen 
and Duke Power are merely in tension or actually contradict each 
other.116 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Public Citizen did not 
address the issue of standing; he, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice 
O’Connor presumptively agreed with the majority’s reasoning on that 
issue.117 If Justice Scalia had participated in this case, it is possible that 
he might have raised objections similar to those he raised later in Fed-
eral Election Commission v. Akins.118 
B. Justice Breyer’s Majority Opinion in Akins 
 In Akins, the Supreme Court concluded that an injury resulting 
from the government’s failure to provide required information can 
constitute a concrete injury sufficient for standing.119 Akins addressed 
                                                                                                                      
112 See 491 U.S. at 448–51; Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 
U.S. 59, 80 (1978). 
113 438 U.S. at 80 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)); Mank, Global 
Warming, supra note 12, at 21–22. 
114 Compare Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 80; with Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 440. 
115 See Yackle, supra note 12, at 342 (“The ‘generalized grievance’ formulation is noto-
riously ambiguous.”); Solimine, supra note 13, at 1027 (discussing “whether the barrier to 
bring [generalized grievance] cases is a constitutional or prudential one”). 
116 See Solimine, supra note 13, at 1027 (discussing ambiguities in the concept of gen-
eralized grievances). 
117 See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 467–89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment). 
118 See 524 U.S. 11, 29–37 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
119 Id. at 21 (majority opinion) (discussing Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 
Pub. L. No. 92–225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8) (2006) (stat-
ing that an aggrieved party may file a petition if the FEC dismisses a complaint or fails to 
act on a complaint within the stated time period)); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regula-
tion and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 613, 634–36, 644–45 
(1999). 
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whether voters had standing to challenge a Federal Election Commis-
sion (FEC) decision that a lobbying group was not a “political commit-
tee” within the definition of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
(FECA),120 and accordingly, did not have to disclose its donors, fund-
ing, or expenses.121 FECA “imposes extensive recordkeeping and dis-
closure requirements upon groups that fall within the Act’s definition 
of a ‘political committee.’”122 The statute authorized “‘[a]ny party ag-
grieved by’” a FEC order to seek judicial review in federal court.123 
 The Court rejected the FEC’s argument that prudential standing 
considerations should bar the suit because “[h]istory associates the 
word ‘aggrieved’ with a congressional intent to cast the standing net 
broadly—beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory 
rights upon which ‘prudential’ standing traditionally rested.”124 Fur-
thermore, the Akins decision concluded that “[t]he injury of which re-
spondents complain—their failure to obtain relevant information—is 
injury of a kind that FECA seeks to address.”125 After examining the 
statute’s language, the Court decided that Congress intended to protect 
citizens from this type of injury and that respondents, therefore, satis-
fied the prudential standing requirements.126 
 Additionally, Akins concluded that Congress had “the constitu-
tional power to authorize federal courts to adjudicate this lawsuit.”127 
The Akins decision determined that the government’s refusal to pro-
vide information to the plaintiff voters for which the Act required dis-
closure was a constitutionally “genuine ‘injury in fact.’”128 The Court 
concluded that such deprivation of information, which the plaintiffs 
could use “to evaluate candidates for public office,” constituted a “con-
crete and particular” injury.129 Furthermore, the Court observed that 
the Court in Public Citizen had “held that a plaintiff suffers an ‘injury in 
fact’ when the plaintiff fails to obtain information which must be pub-
                                                                                                                      
120 Pub. L. No. 92–225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–456 (2006 & 
West Supp. 2011)). 
121 See Akins, 524 U.S. at 13–14; Mank, Global Warming, supra note 12, at 37. 
122 Akins, 524 U.S. at 14. 
123 Id. at 19 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A) (1994)) (brackets in original). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 20. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Akins, 524 U.S. at 21. 
129 Id. 
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licly disclosed pursuant to a statute” and implied that the same reason-
ing applied to Akins.130 
 The government argued that the plaintiffs should not have stand-
ing because they suffered only a generalized grievance common to all 
other voters.131 The Court rejected this argument because the statute 
specifically authorized voters to request information from the FEC, 
which therefore overrode any prudential standing limitations against 
generalized grievances.132 The Court distinguished prior cases with ju-
dicially imposed prudential norms against generalized grievances by 
reasoning that it would deny standing for widely shared, generalized 
injuries only if the harm “is not only widely shared, but is also of an ab-
stract and indefinite nature—for example, harm to the ‘common con-
cern for obedience to law.’”133 Akins stated that Article III standing was 
permissible even if many people suffered similar injuries as long as 
those injuries were concrete and not abstract.134 If such an interest were 
sufficiently concrete, then it could qualify as an injury in fact.135 Accord-
ingly, the Akins decision recognized that a plaintiff who suffers a con-
crete injury may sue even though many others have suffered similar in-
juries.136 Although a political forum might be appropriate to address 
widely shared injuries, this fact alone does not exclude an interest for 
Article III purposes.137 “This conclusion seems particularly obvious 
where . . . large numbers of individuals suffer the same common-law in-
jury . . . or where large numbers of voters suffer interference with voting 
rights conferred by law.”138 Thus, Akins makes clear that courts should 
not deny standing merely because large numbers of persons have the 
                                                                                                                      
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 23. 
132 Id. at 19–21; see Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 718; Sunstein, 
supra note 119, at 634–36, 642–45 (stating that Akins concluded that the statute at issue over-
rode any prudential limitations against generalized grievances); see Kimberly N. Brown, 
What’s Left Standing? FECA Citizen Suits and the Battle for Judicial Review, 55 U. Kan. L. Rev 677, 
678 (2007). 
133 Akins, 549 U.S. at 23. The Supreme Court has not been clear on whether generalized 
grievances pose a constitutional or prudential barrier to standing, and the issue has been 
subject to much debate. Solimine, supra note 13, at 1027 n.14. The Akins decision implied 
that the rule against generalized grievances is only prudential in nature, but did not explicitly 
decide the issue. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 19; accord Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra 
note 1, at 718 (discussing Akins as treating generalized grievances as prudential); Sunstein, 
supra note 119, at 634–36 (discussing the four-part analysis of plaintiff’s standing in Akins). 
134 524 U.S. at 24–25. 
135 Id. at 24; see Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 717. 
136 Akins, 524 U.S. at 24. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
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same or similar injuries so long as those injuries are concrete.139 Fur-
thermore, Akins implies that Congress has the authority to extend stand-
ing to the outer limits of Article III by broadly defining what constitutes 
a concrete statutory injury as opposed to an abstract injury.140 
                                                                                                                     
 The Akins decision stressed that courts should strongly consider 
Congress’s intent in defining statutory rights when determining 
whether a statutory injury is concrete.141 By implying that “Congress 
has broad authority to define which injuries are sufficient for constitu-
tional standing,” the Akins majority adopted a more similar approach to 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence rather than Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion in Lujan.”142 Justice Scalia emphasized that Article III prohibits 
Congress from granting standing to a plaintiff with merely a general-
ized grievance caused by the government’s failure to enforce the law.143 
Akins, on the other hand, implied that a generalized grievance is usu-
ally a prudential limitation that Congress can waive by defining the cir-
cumstances in which a class of litigants may seek a remedy for a widely 
shared injury.144 
 
 
139 Id. 
140 See Pye v. United States, 269 F.3d 459, 469 (4th Cir. 2001); Solimine, supra note 13, 
at 1050 (“FEC v. Akins, seem[s] to evince a more generous reading of congressional power 
to influence standing.”); accord Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 719. 
141 Akins, 524 U.S. at 19, 24–25; Brown, supra note 132, at 688, 690–94 (arguing that 
Akins recognized that Congress has significant power to define which injuries are sufficient 
for Article III standing); Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 719 (arguing 
that the Akins court emphasized the weight congressional intent should be given); Sun-
stein, supra note 119, at 616–17, 645 (arguing that Akins gives Congress the authority to 
waive the prudential presumption against suits involving generalized grievances, especially 
in suits involving informational injuries). 
142 Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 719 (noting that Akins looked 
to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan over Justice Scalia’s majority opinion on this 
point); see Brown, supra note 132, at 693–94 (stating that Akins “elevated Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Lujan, in which he reiterated that Congress is empowered to define inju-
ries that give rise to a cause of action that did not exist at common law”); Sunstein, supra 
note 119, at 617 (“Akins appears to vindicate the passage from Justice Kennedy’s important 
concurring opinion in Lujan.”). 
143 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992); Mank, Standing and 
Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 719–20; Sunstein, supra note 119, at 643 (stating that 
“before Akins . . . the ban on generalized grievances was moving from a prudential one to 
one rooted in Article III. Lujan seemed to suggest that to have standing, citizens would 
have to show that their injuries were ‘particular’ in the sense that they were not widely 
shared.”) (footnotes and citations omitted). Justice Scalia also suggested that the Constitu-
tion’s Article II, section 3 provision that the President is responsible to “take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed” bars Congress from authorizing citizen suits as private attor-
neys general by those who lack a concrete injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577. 
144 Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 719–20; see Brown, supra note 
132 at 689–94 (arguing that Akins differs from Lujan by recognizing Congress’s authority 
to define standing in statutes); Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1714–15 (arguing 
2012] Informational Standing After Summers 21 
C. Justice Scalia’s Dissenting Opinion in Akins 
 Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Justices O’Connor and Tho-
mas, argued that the plaintiffs suffered a generalized grievance com-
mon to all members of the public.145 Justice Scalia contended that Arti-
cle III prohibits even generalized grievances involving concrete injuries 
because Lujan mandated that an injury be concrete and that the harm 
be “particularized” —the injury “‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal 
and individual way.’”146 Because the Akins plaintiffs’ alleged informa-
tional injury was an “‘undifferentiated’” generalized grievance that was 
“‘common to all members of the public,’” the plaintiffs must resolve 
the injury “by political, rather than judicial, means.”147 More broadly, 
Justice Scalia dissented in Akins because he believed that the majority 
opinion inappropriately granted the judiciary the authority to decide 
generalized grievances that are instead the exclusive responsibility of 
the executive branch under both Article III and the President’s Article 
II authority.148 Thus, he returned to the broader principle that the 
“standing doctrine was a ‘crucial and inseparable element’ of separa-
tion of powers principles” and “that more restrictive standing rules” 
would limit judicial interference with the popularly elected legislative 
and executive branches.149 Perhaps surprisingly, Justice Scalia did not 
explicitly argue that the Court had overruled any part of Lujan; he may 
have believed that the two cases could be reconciled or perhaps he 
hoped to limit the scope of Akins in subsequent cases, as he arguably 
did in his Summers decision.150 
                                                                                                                      
that Akins held generalized grievances as prudential barriers that can be waived by Con-
gress without ruling on Congress’s constitutional power to define standing); Sunstein, 
supra note 119, at 635–36, 644–45, 672–75 (discussing Congress’s authority to grant stand-
ing and legal interests in light of Akins). Akins did not address or resolve whether Article 
III in some circumstances forbids suits that are generalized grievances. 524 U.S. at 23 
(“Whether styled as a constitutional or prudential limit on standing, the Court has some-
times determined that where large numbers of Americans suffer alike, the political proc-
ess, rather than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate remedy for a 
widely shared grievance.” (citations omitted)). 
145 Akins, 524 U.S. at 29–31. 
146 Id. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 504 U.S. at 560 n.1); accord Mank, Standing 
and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 720. 
147 524 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 
166, 177 (1974)); accord Mank, Global Warming, supra note 12, at 39; Mank, Standing and 
Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 720. 
148 524 U.S. at 29–37; see Brown, supra note 132, at 702–03; Mank, Standing and Statisti-
cal Persons, supra note 1, at 721; Sunstein, supra note 119, at 616–17, 637, 643–47. 
149 Percival, supra note 12, at 847 (quoting Scalia, supra note 2, at 881); see also Mank, 
Global Warming, supra note 12, at 29. 
150 See 524 U.S. at 29–37; Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 491–98 (2009). 
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III. Summers Rejects Probabilistic Standing and Limits 
Procedural Standing 
 The litigation that culminated in the Summers v. Earth Island Insti-
tute decision began when the U.S. Forest Service (Service) approved 
the Burnt Ridge Project, which involved the salvage sale—without pub-
lic notice and comment—of timber on 238 acres of fire-damaged land 
in the Sequoia National Forest.151 Several environmental organizations 
then filed suit seeking an injunction to prevent the Service from im-
plementing new regulations.152 These regulations exempted salvage 
sales of less than 250 acres from the notice, comment, and appeal pro-
cess that Congress required the Service to apply to “significant land 
management decisions.”153 The plaintiffs also challenged other Service 
regulations that did not apply to Burnt Ridge.154 After the court grant-
ed a preliminary injunction against the Burnt Ridge salvage-timber 
sale, the plaintiffs and Service settled their dispute.155 Despite the gov-
ernment’s argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge 
other salvage sales once they settled the Burnt Ridge Project case, the 
court decided the plaintiffs’ broader challenges to the Service’s salvage 
sale policies.156 The court invalidated five of the Service’s regulations 
and entered a nationwide injunction against their application.157 The 
Ninth Circuit later concluded that the plaintiffs’ challenges to regula-
tions not at issue in the Burnt Ridge Project were not yet ripe for adju-
dication.158 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the court’s conclu-
sion that two regulations applicable to the Burnt Ridge Project were 
illegal and, therefore, upheld the nationwide injunction against the 
application of those two regulations.159 
                                                                                                                      
151 555 U.S. 488, 490–92 (2009). This discussion of Summers is based in part on my arti-
cles: Mank, Rejects Probabilistic Standing, supra note 1, at 103–11 and Mank, Implications for 
Future Standing Decisions, supra note 1, at 10,962–65. 
152 Summers, 555 U.S. at 489–90 (basing claims on Act that “required the Forest Service 
to establish a notice, comment, and appeal process for ‘proposed actions of the Forest 
Service concerning projects and activities implementing land and resource management 
plans developed under the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 
1974’”). 
153 Forest Service Decision Making and Appeals Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 102–381, 
§ 322, 106 Stat. 1374, 1419 (1992), reprinted in 16 U.S.C. § 1612 (2006). 
154 Summers, 555 U.S. at 491. 
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156 Id. at 491–92. 
157 Id. at 492. 
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A. Justice Scalia’s Majority Opinion Rejects Probabilistic Standing and 
Arguably Limits Procedural Standing 
 In Summers, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion determined that the 
plaintiffs failed to meet the injury portion of the standing test once 
they settled the Burnt Ridge Project dispute.160 The Court reasoned 
that the plaintiffs had initially satisfied the injury requirement when 
they submitted an affidavit alleging that an organization member “had 
repeatedly visited the Burnt Ridge site, that he had imminent plans to 
do so again,” and that the government’s actions would harm his aes-
thetic interests in viewing the flora and fauna at the site.161 Justice 
Scalia concluded, however, that the settlement had resolved the mem-
ber’s injury and that none of the other affidavits submitted by the 
plaintiffs alleged an imminent injury at a specific site.162 Another affi-
ant for the plaintiffs asserted that he visited a large number of national 
parks during his lifetime, that he had suffered injury in the past from 
development on Forest Service land, and that he planned to visit sev-
eral unnamed national forests in the future.163 The Court deemed his 
affidavit insufficient for standing because he could not identify any par-
ticular site and time where he was likely to be harmed by salvage timber 
sales or other allegedly illegal actions authorized by the challenged 
regulations, thereby failing to satisfy the imminent injury require-
en
                                                                                                                     
m t.164 
 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion rejected the concept of probabilis-
tic standing, which states that an organization has standing based on 
the probability that some members of the organization will be harmed 
in the future.165 The Sierra Club alleged in the complaint that it has 
more than 700,000 national members, and, accordingly, that it was 
probable the Service’s implementation of the challenged regulations 
would harm at least one of its members in the near future.166 The 
Court rejected the plaintiffs’ probabilistic standing argument because it 
concluded that an organizational plaintiff must identify specific mem-
 
160 555 U.S. at 491–92. 
161 Id. at 494. 
162 Id. at 493–96. 
163 Id. at 495. 
164 Id. at 495–97. “There may be a chance, but is hardly a likelihood, that [affiant’s] 
wanderings will bring him to a parcel about to be affected by a project unlawfully subject 
to the regulations.” Id. at 495. 
165 Id. at 496; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 750. 
166 See Summers, 555 U.S. at 502 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Corrected Complaint 
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Appendix ¶ 12 at 34, Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 
376 F. Supp. 2d 994 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (No. CIV F-03–6386 JKS)). 
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bers who are being injured or will be imminently injured at a particular 
time and location.167 Justice Scalia argued that although it may be pos-
sible that a member of the plaintiff organization would meet the stand-
ing criteria at some point in the future, mere statistical probability is 
act of Sum-
mers on future procedural rights cases remains uncertain.176 
                                                                                                                     
insufficient to meet standing requirements.168 
 Arguably, the Summers Court assigned a rigorous standing burden 
for procedural rights plaintiffs.169 The Summers decision may have re-
treated from the relaxation of the imminence standard for procedural 
rights plaintiffs found in footnote seven of Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life.170 By implicitly conceding that footnote seven in Lujan recognized 
that Congress has some authority to redefine the redressability require-
ment to enable procedural rights plaintiffs to sue, the Summers decision 
appeared to limit congressional authority to change standing rules by 
emphasizing that procedural rights plaintiffs must still meet the Article 
III concrete injury requirement.171 Congress has the power to relax the 
standing requirement in terms of redressability, but not the require-
ment of injury in fact.172 Instead, “the requirement of injury in fact is a 
hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by stat-
ute.”173 Importantly, Justice Scalia stated in Summers that procedural 
rights plaintiffs are entitled to relaxed redressability requirements, but 
did not address relaxed standards for immediacy.174 The Summers deci-
sion, however, did not explicitly overrule the relaxed imminence test 
established in footnote seven of Lujan.175 Therefore, the imp
 
167 Id. at 499 (majority opinion). Justice Scalia acknowledged that an organization has 
standing if all of its members are likely to suffer an injury. Id. (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex 
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958)). 
168 Id. 
169 Mank, Implications for Future Standing Decisions, supra note 1, at 10,963; see 555 U.S. at 
493. 
170 See 555 U.S. at 496 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 (1992)); Mank, Implications for 
Future Standing Decisions, supra note 1, at 10,963. 
171 Mank, Implications for Future Standing Decisions, supra note 1, at 10,963; see Summers, 
555 U.S. at 496. 
172 Summers, 555 U.S. at 496. 
173 Id. 
174 Mank, Implications for Future Standing Decisions, supra note 1, at 10,963; see 555 U.S. at 
496. 
175 See Summers, 555 U.S. at 496. 
176 Mank, Implications for Future Standing Decisions, supra note 1, at 10,963; see Summers, 
555 U.S. at 497. 
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B. Justice Kennedy’s Concurring Opinion 
 In a short concurrence in Summers, Justice Kennedy echoed his 
concurring opinion in Lujan, and explained that he believed a plaintiff 
can challenge the alleged violation of a procedural right only if the 
plaintiff can demonstrate a separate concrete injury.177 Kennedy fur-
ther found that the plaintiffs did not meet this standard in Summers.178 
He asserted that, “[t]his case would present different considerations if 
Congress had sought to provide redress for a concrete injury ‘giv[ing] 
rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.’”179 Justice 
Kennedy concluded that the statute at issue did not include an express 
citizen suit provision, meaning that Congress did not intend the statute 
to bestow any right other than a procedural right.180 Like his concur-
rence in Lujan, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Summers left open the 
possibility that he might have concluded that the plaintiffs met Article 
III standing requirements, despite Justice Scalia’s more fundamental 
separation of powers concerns, if Congress had enacted a more explicit 
statute that clearly defined when a procedural injury constitutes a con-
crete harm to a particular class of plaintiffs.181 
C. Justice Breyer’s Dissenting Opinion 
 In his dissent in Summers, Justice Breyer proposed that the Court 
adopt a “realistic threat” test for determining when an injury is suffi-
ciently imminent and concrete for standing.182 Although acknowledg-
ing that the Court had sometimes used the term “imminent” as a test in 
its standing decisions, he argued that the majority’s opinion wrongly 
used the term to prohibit standing.183 In contrast, prior decisions had 
used the term to reject standing only when the alleged harm “was 
merely ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’ or otherwise speculative.”184 Jus-
tice Breyer contended that the majority’s use of the imminent test was 
                                                                                                                      
177 555 U.S. at 500. 
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unsuitable if a plaintiff was already injured, as was the case in Sum-
mers.185 Furthermore, standing should not be denied if “there is a realis-
tic likelihood that the challenged future conduct will, in fact, recur and 
harm the plaintiff.”186 Justice Breyer argued that the Court’s prior 
standing decisions demanded only that a plaintiff establish a “realistic 
threat” of injury, which does not require more “than the word ‘realistic’ 
implies.”187 Although he conceded that the plaintiffs could not predict 
where and when their members would be harmed by the Service’s sale 
of salvage timber, Justice Breyer reasoned that there was a realistic 
threat that some of the thousands of members of the plaintiff organiza-
tions would likely be harmed in the reasonably near future.188 Accord-
ingly, Justice Breyer concluded that the plaintiffs satisfied the Court’s 
standing requirements.189 If it is likely that at least one member of the 
plaintiff organizations will meet all standing criteria in the near future, 
Justice Breyer reasoned that federal courts should recognize Article III 
standing even if a court does not know the details of the specific harm 
that may occur.190 
 Perhaps anticipating that the issue might arise in the future, Justice 
Breyer argued that the plaintiffs would have had standing if Congress 
expressly sought to give standing to groups like the plaintiffs, stating: 
To understand the constitutional issue that the majority decides, 
it may prove helpful to imagine that Congress enacted a statu-
tory provision that expressly permitted environmental groups 
like the respondents here to bring cases just like the present 
one, provided (1) that the group has members who have used 
salvage-timber parcels in the past and are likely to do so in the 
future, and (2) that the group’s members have opposed Forest 
Service timber sales in the past (using notice, comment, and 
appeal procedures to do so) and will likely use those proce-
dures to oppose salvage-timber sales in the future. The major-
ity cannot, and does not, claim that such a statute would be 
unconstitutional.191 
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In making the claim that the “majority cannot, and does not, claim that 
such a statute would be unconstitutional,” Justice Breyer cited Massa-
chusetts v. EPA for support,192 which Justice Kennedy joined and Justice 
Scalia and the three other members of the Summers majority dis-
sented.193 Based on Justice Kennedy’s previous decisions in other major 
standing cases, Justice Breyer appeared to rely on Justice Kennedy for 
support in future cases if Congress were to explicitly define injury in 
fact as an injury similar to the one suffered by the plaintiffs in Sum-
mers.194 Thus, Summers, like Lujan, Akins and Massachusetts v. EPA, dem-
onstrated both the importance of Justice Kennedy’s vote and his belief 
that Congress has significant authority under Article III to define a con-
stitutional concrete injury.195 
IV. Divided Lower Court Decisions on Informational Standing 
 Lower courts are divided in environmental cases where plaintiffs 
have sought standing based on alleged injuries resulting from the gov-
ernment’s, or private defendant’s, failure to provide information about 
their environmental impacts.196 In Foundation on Economic Trends v. 
Lyng, a case decided prior to FEC v. Akins, the D.C. Circuit questioned 
whether informational standing alone could meet the Article III injury 
in fact requirement.197 In contrast, citing Akins, a divided panel of the 
Sixth Circuit in American Canoe Association, Inc. v. City of Louisa Water & 
Sewer Commission concluded that environmental groups had standing to 
seek information from the government about water pollution issues, 
pursuant to the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act, that would 
assist their members’ understanding of pollution issues and legislative 
proposals.198 Most recently, the Ninth Circuit in Wilderness Society Inc. v. 
Rey interpreted Summers and Akins to implicitly restrict the scope of in-
formational standing to statutes that give plaintiffs an explicit right to 
information from the government.199 
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A. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng: The D.C. Circuit Suggests 
Limiting Informational Standing to Informational Injuries 
 In Lyng, the D.C. Circuit expressed doubts regarding whether in-
formational standing alone can meet the Article III injury in fact re-
quirement, but did not actually decide the issue.200 The plaintiffs— in-
cluding a private nonprofit organization active in issues of biotechnol-
ogy and genetics engineering—sought an injunction and a declaratory 
judgment against officials of the United States Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA).201 The plaintiffs sought an Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
regarding the USDA’s “germplasm preservation program.”202 The 
USDA had undertaken a variety of actions to preserve and expand a 
diverse plant genetic base to assure the nation’s food supply, but there 
was no specific “germplasm preservation program.”203 “On cross-motions 
for summary judgment, the trial court held that the plaintiffs failed to 
identify ‘a particular proposal for federal action’ or ‘any revisions or 
changes taken by the defendants in the germplasm program that would 
trigger the obligation to prepare an [EIS] . . . .’”204 
 The trial court did not address standing concerns because the de-
fendants did not challenge the issue.205 After the trial court granted 
summary judgment, the Supreme Court issued its Lujan v. National Wild-
life Federation decision.206 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit decided that Na-
tional Wildlife Federation required it to first consider whether the plaintiffs 
had standing.207 
 Lyng reviewed previous D.C. Circuit decisions that had discussed 
“informational standing” as a basis for standing and then considered 
whether those cases were still good law in light of National Wildlife Fed-
eration.208 In Scientists’ Institute for Public Information, Inc. (SIPI) v. Atomic 
Energy Commission, the D.C. Circuit suggested, in a footnote, that the 
plaintiff might have informational standing because its organizational 
purpose—distributing scientific information to the public—was nega-
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tively affected by the Agency’s failure to provide an EIS.209 While a pre-
vious D.C. Circuit decision erroneously characterized SIPI as holding 
that standing could be based on an informational injury,210 Lyng cor-
rectly observed that the informational standing footnote in SIPI was not 
necessary to the decision in that case.211 In Action Alliance of Senior Citi-
zens v. Heckler, the D.C. Circuit held that organizations devoted to advis-
ing senior citizens about age discrimination and other matters had 
standing to challenge regulations restricting the flow of public informa-
tion concerning an agency’s compliance with the Age Discrimination 
Act of 1975 because such restrictions injured the plaintiff through the 
“alleged inhibition of their daily operations.”212 
 Citing Action Alliance and SIPI, the D.C. Circuit in National Wildlife 
Federation v. Hodel endorsed informational standing by stating that “for 
affiants voicing environmental concerns . . . the elimination of the op-
portunity to see and use an EIS prepared under federal law does consti-
tute a constitutionally sufficient injury on which to ground standing.”213 
It was not clear, however, that the Department of Interior (Interior) vio-
lated NEPA when it delegated its authority to the states to approve min-
ing plans on federal lands—a process governed by NEPA when per-
formed by federal authorities.214 Furthermore, prior courts did not in-
dicate whether NEPA provided plaintiffs with the right to demand that 
Interior issue EISs of new mines approved by state authorities.215 Never-
theless, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs suffered an infor-
mational injury because the plaintiff could no longer request an EIS, 
and therefore lost the “ability to evaluate and oppose future mining.”216 
 In Competitive Enterprise Institute v. National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, the D.C. Circuit endorsed the plaintiffs’ informational 
standing theory, but concluded for other reasons that the plaintiffs 
lacked standing.217 The court agreed with the plaintiffs’ informational 
standing theory, stating “[a]llegations of injury to an organization’s 
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ability to disseminate information may be deemed sufficiently particu-
lar for standing purposes where that information is essential to the in-
jured organization’s activities.”218 The court, however, held that the 
plaintiff lacked standing because they wanted information about traffic 
fatalities, not environmental issues, and thus were “outside the sphere 
of any definition of injury adopted in NEPA cases.”219 
 Although acknowledging that Hodel and Competitive Enterprise Insti-
tute endorsed informational standing, the Lyng decision held that the 
D.C. Circuit had “never sustained an organization’s standing in a NEPA 
case solely on the basis of ‘informational injury,’ that is, damage to the 
organization’s interest in disseminating the environmental data an im-
pact statement could be expected to contain.”220 The court realized 
that “if the injury in fact is the lack of information about the environ-
mental impact of agency action, it follows that the injury is caused by the 
agency’s failure to develop such information in an impact statement 
and can be redressed by ordering the agency to prepare one.”221 The 
court noted, however, that adopting such an expansive approach would 
raise complications.222 For example, a court might do away with the 
standing requirement in NEPA cases unless the organization alleged 
that the information they required did not concern the environ-
ment.223 Additionally, “[t]he proposition that an organization’s desire 
to supply environmental information to its members, and the conse-
quent ‘injury’ it suffers when the information is not forthcoming in an 
impact statement, establishes standing [but] without more [it] also en-
counters the obstacle of Sierra Club v. Morton.”224 In Morton, the Court 
concluded that it did not matter how long the Sierra Club had been 
interested in the issue or how qualified the organization was in assess-
ing environmental issues, interest and qualification alone were inade-
quate to allow standing.225 Accordingly, the Lyng court reasoned that 
standing could not be conferred based on a mere interest.226 
 The Lyng court also observed that the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Richardson “rejected a similar claim of informational standing 
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on the ground that the effect on the plaintiff there from the lack of 
information was undifferentiated and common to all members of the 
public.”227 The Lyng court thus reasoned that there was no basis to treat 
a request for information from an organization, such as the plaintiff’s, 
differently from the individual request for information rejected in 
Richardson.228 Additionally, the Lyng court warned that plaintiffs could 
use the theory of informational injury to demand information from 
agencies pursuant to NEPA about any of their daily operations.229 The 
Court suggested that if informational injury could confer standing, 
then a potential plaintiff could have standing anytime an agency could 
not create the requested information.230 
 The Lyng court did not decide whether the plaintiffs had standing 
because it concluded that the Supreme Court’s decision in National 
Wildlife Federation precluded their case under section 702 of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA).231 The Lyng court interpreted National 
Wildlife Federation to require NEPA plaintiffs to identify a particular 
agency action that triggered a duty to prepare an EIS.232 The court con-
sidered NEPA suits without a triggering event to be requests for infor-
mation relating to an agency’s day-to-day operations that should there-
fore be rejected.233 The court also concluded that the trial court should 
have dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.234 
This conclusion derived from the understanding that the plaintiff’s re-
quest for information about the USDA’s “germplasm preservation pro-
gram” was really a request for information about daily operations simi-
lar to those made in National Wildlife Federation.235 The Lyng decision 
did not bar all requests for information under NEPA, but limited in-
formational requests to cases where a particular agency action triggers 
an injury to the plaintiff.236 Although it did not prohibit informational 
standing claims under NEPA, the Lyng court suggested that standing 
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should be limited to those circumstances where plaintiffs may invoke 
informational injury.237 
B. American Canoe Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Louisa Water & Sewer 
Commission: A Divided Sixth Circuit Endorses Informational Standing Under 
the Citizen Suit Provision of the Clean Water Act 
1. Panel Majority Holds Plaintiffs Have Informational Standing 
 In a post-Akins decision, a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit con-
cluded that environmental groups had standing to seek information 
from the government about water pollution issues pursuant to the citi-
zen suit provision of the Clean Water Act (CWA) if it would assist their 
members in understanding pollution issues and legislative proposals.238 
Two organizational plaintiffs filed a CWA citizen suit in federal court 
alleging that the defendants violated their National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System permit and various provisions of the CWA.239 The 
court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
because it concluded that the plaintiffs did not meet standing require-
ments.240 The Sixth Circuit panel, however, decided that the plaintiffs 
had standing and reversed and remanded the case for further proceed-
ings.241 
a. Standing for Kash’s Recreational and Informational Injuries 
 In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC) 
Inc., a case analyzed by the Sixth Circuit in American Canoe, the Su-
preme Court held that the plaintiffs had standing to sue pursuant to 
the CWA citizen suit provision because they avoided swimming and rec-
reational activities in a river due to “reasonable concerns” about pollu-
tion released by the defendant.242 In American Canoe the Sixth Circuit 
concluded that Daniel Kash, a member of the Sierra Club, also had 
standing to sue under the CWA citizen suit provision.243 The plaintiff 
alleged that he used the Big Sandy River for recreation in the past and 
hoped to in the future, but declined to do so currently because of the 
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pollution the defendants released into the river.244 The Sixth Circuit 
determined that such “averments are virtually indistinguishable from 
those that the Court found sufficient to establish an injury in fact in 
Laidlaw,” and, accordingly that the Sierra Club had representational 
standing to sue on behalf of its injured member.245 
 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit panel concluded that the Sierra 
Club had standing to sue for such informational injuries because “[t]he 
averments of its member, Kash, establish that the lack of information 
caused an injury beyond the ‘common concern for obedience to 
law.’”246 Kash’s affidavit asserted that the defendants’ failure to provide 
the public with statutorily required information about the amount of 
pollution it released into the Big Sandy River deprived him of the abil-
ity to assess the river’s safety.247 According to the court, these allega-
tions constituted “a concrete and particularized injury” and established 
standing.248 In a footnote, the court acknowledged that federal courts 
of appeals had disagreed over whether plaintiffs without standing to 
sue for a defendant’s discharge violations could have standing to sue 
for its violations of monitoring and reporting requirements.249 The 
Sixth Circuit determined it was unnecessary to resolve that issue be-
cause, by representing its members, the Sierra Club had standing to sue 
the defendants for their discharge violations.250 
 Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit determined that the Sierra Club 
demonstrated that Kash’s injury was “fairly traceable to the . . . allegedly 
unlawful conduct [of the defendants] and likely to be redressed by the 
requested relief.”251 The court reasoned that plaintiffs’ informational 
injury would have been redressed had the defendants met their moni-
toring and reporting obligations.252 Similarly, Kash’s aesthetic and rec-
reational injury from the pollution in the Big Sandy River could be 
traced plausibly to defendants’ effluent discharges and would be re-
dressed by a finding against the defendants.253 Thus, plaintiffs’ claim 
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was sufficient to survive defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of stand-
ing.254 
b. Organizational Standing for the American Canoe Association and Sierra 
Club to Sue on Their Own Behalf for the Defendants’ Monitoring and Re-
porting Violations 
 In addition to claiming standing as representatives of their mem-
bers, the American Canoe Association and the Sierra Club alleged that 
the defendants’ monitoring and reporting violations injured their or-
ganizations, and thus provided them with organizational standing in-
dependent of their representative capacity to sue on behalf of their 
members.255 The Sixth Circuit recognized Supreme Court precedent 
for the principle that an association may sue for its own injuries even if 
its members also have standing.256 The plaintiff organizations alleged 
an informational injury sufficient for standing because the defendants’ 
violations hindered their efforts to research and report on the compli-
ance of Kentucky dischargers, and to propose and lobby for legislation 
to limit a facility’s discharge to protect water quality.257 The plaintiff 
organizations relied on Akins, where the Court found an informational 
injury under the Federal Election Campaign Act, and Public Citizen v. 
U.S. Department of Justice, where the Court recognized informational 
standing pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).258 
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s informational injury 
under the CWA was analogous to both cases.259 
 The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that Akins did not specify whether 
Congress can create standing by simply establishing a statutory right to 
information or whether there must be an additional plus factor.260 Yet, 
the court concluded that a plus factor existed.261 In coming to this con-
clusion, the Sixth Circuit compared Akins to the Court’s decision in 
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Public Citizen.262 In Public Citizen, the Court concluded that there was a 
low threshold for informational standing under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA) and plaintiffs had to show only that the Agency re-
fused to provide specific records upon request.263 Accordingly, the 
Court held plaintiffs seeking information under FACA had standing.264 
In light of Public Citizen, the Sixth Circuit did not interpret Akins to re-
quire any additional plus factor for standing if a statute grants a plain-
tiff the right to information that was denied.265 
 To the extent that Akins implicitly requires a plus factor for infor-
mational standing, such as an additional reason for needing the infor-
mation, the Sixth Circuit concluded that this demand is satisfied in 
American Canoe.266 Consequently, the court observed that “it is difficult 
to imagine what information would not make a citizen a better-
informed voter, or would not affect her ability to participate in some 
workings of government.”267 The Sixth Circuit therefore determined 
that the monitoring and reporting information sought by the plaintiffs 
was similar enough to the information sought in Akins and Public Citizen 
to grant standing and find informational injury.268 
 The Sixth Circuit held that the injury alleged by the American Ca-
noe Association and the Sierra Club was sufficient to grant informa-
tional standing.269 Distinguishing the Court’s rejection of pure ideo-
logical standing in Sierra Club v. Morton, the court in American Canoe ex-
plained that the plaintiffs did not base their claims solely on an 
ideological or societal belief.270 Instead, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that 
the plaintiffs demonstrated an informational injury because the defen-
dants’ failure to adequately monitor and report their discharges 
harmed the plaintiffs’ organizational interests.271 The court supported 
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its decision with a detailed list of specific harms that the plaintiff suf-
fered as a result of the defendants’ actions.272 
 The Sixth Circuit also relied on the Court’s decision in Havens Re-
alty Corp. v. Coleman, a Fair Housing Act case, for the principle that inju-
ries to an organization’s operations are cognizable injuries for stand-
ing.273 The Court in Havens found that the plaintiff organization had 
standing to sue because the defendant owner of an apartment complex 
harmed the plaintiff by engaging in racial steering practices that in-
jured the plaintiff’s ability to provide housing counseling and referral 
services to its members.274 In American Canoe, the Sixth Circuit relied on 
the reasoning that “[s]uch concrete an [sic] demonstrable injury to the 
organization’s activities—with the consequent drain on the organiza-
tion’s resources—constitutes far more than simply a setback to the or-
ganization’s abstract social interest . . . .”275 Thus, the American Canoe 
court recognized that the plaintiffs suffered informational injuries as a 
result of the defendants’ failure to provide information required by the 
CWA.276 Therefore, they had organizational standing because the de-
fendants’ withholding of information hampered their ability to provide 
important information to their members and engage in legislative re-
form initiatives.277 
2. Judge Kennedy’s Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 
 Judge Cornelia G. Kennedy agreed with the majority that the Si-
erra Club had representational standing because the defendants’ ac-
tions had injured one of its members.278 However, she disagreed with 
the majority’s decision that the American Canoe Association had in-
formational standing.279 Judge Kennedy relied on the D.C. Circuit’s 
opinion in Lyng to question whether an informational injury, without 
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more, is sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact requirement.280 Addition-
ally, she interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in Morton to hold 
that informational injuries alone are insufficient to satisfy the injury in 
fact requirement.281 
 Judge Kennedy concluded her discussion of Lyng and Morton by 
noting the potential contradiction in granting standing to associations 
injured by a lack of access to information for problems of special inter-
est, and yet not completely eliminating standing requirements for other 
organizations and citizens.282 By this reasoning, Judge Kennedy cast 
doubt upon the broad adoption of an informational standing theory in 
American Canoe.283 Judge Kennedy rejected the majority’s novel inter-
pretation of Akins and Public Citizen in part because it was broader than 
that adopted by any other federal circuit court of appeals.284 In creating 
such a permissive standard, Judge Kennedy observed, the majority ig-
nored the precedent set by Lujan and Morton, and interpreted Akins 
and Public Citizen far more broadly than the Court intended.285 
 Although Judge Kennedy acknowledged that Akins and Public Citi-
zen found specific injuries based on a lack of information, she distin-
guished those cases because they involved statutes conferring a specific 
right to information upon certain individuals and groups.286 By con-
trast, Judge Kennedy suggested that the CWA does not create a specific 
right to any information.287 Nevertheless, the CWA requires the dis-
charger to file permit compliance information, which is then available 
as a public record.288 Judge Kennedy, however, concluded the informa-
tion rights under the CWA are secondary to its environmental protec-
tion goals and are thus significantly different than the rights in Akins 
and Public Citizen, where the statutes at issue were explicitly created to 
provide the voting public with pertinent information.289 
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 Judge Kennedy feared that the majority’s interpretation of informa-
tional standing rights would encourage future litigation and allow “any 
other national organization with a passing interest in rivers or the envi-
ronment [to] prosecut[e] a claim.”290 Judge Kennedy characterized the 
plaintiff’s injury as the basic common interest of invested individuals 
and organizations to “uphold[] the rule of law,” and therefore too 
broad to allow standing.291 She distinguished Havens, which implicated 
broad societal interests because the harms were far more concen-
trated.292 Specifically, Judge Kennedy viewed the discriminatory harms 
to the Havens’ plaintiff organization’s work of promoting minority 
group access to suitable apartments as more “specific, cognizable, and 
particular” than the plaintiff organization’s generalized grievance in this 
case.293 Judge Kennedy dismissed the plaintiff organization’s need to 
access information as too general to establish standing because it would 
apply to any organization with a special interest in preserving the envi-
ronment.294 
 Finally, Judge Kennedy expressed doubt as to whether the inability 
to access this information could even be considered an injury.295 The 
American Canoe Association alleged that, without the information at 
issue, they could not research and report on the compliance status of 
pollutant emitters in Kentucky, propose legislation, or bring litigation 
to protect water from harmful discharges.296 In response, Judge Ken-
nedy maintained that there was no evidence that the twelve alleged re-
porting violations impeded the plaintiff organization’s work with its 
members or legislative proposals, particularly in light of the fact that 
the plaintiffs’ complaint identified 405 violations.297 Therefore, Judge 
Kennedy concluded the American Canoe Association’s alleged injury 
was not sufficiently concrete to satisfy the injury in fact requirement.298 
 The Ninth Circuit’s subsequent decision in Wilderness Society sub-
stantially supports Judge Kennedy’s narrow interpretation of Akins and 
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Public Citizen as limited to statutes granting the public an explicit right 
to specific information.299 
C. Wilderness Society v. Rey: The Ninth Circuit Interprets Summers to 
Restrict Procedural Standing to Concrete Injuries 
 In Wilderness Society, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Supreme 
Court’s Summers decision to restrict procedural standing to only those 
plaintiffs who can demonstrate a concrete injury.300 The Ninth Circuit 
restricted the scope of informational standing to prevent plaintiffs from 
using it to avoid Summers’s limitation of procedural standing.301 The 
Ninth Circuit implicitly used a limited interpretation of Akins’s recogni-
tion of informational standing for suits brought under statutes that ex-
plicitly provide the public with the right to particular information from 
the government.302 The Ninth Circuit further concluded that, in light 
of Summers, when an environmental statute only promotes public par-
ticipation and does not explicitly provide the public with a right to in-
formation about certain government projects, it should be read nar-
rowly.303 Otherwise a broad doctrine of informational standing would 
allow plaintiffs to circumvent Summers’s principle that violations of a 
statute are not injuries in fact unless they are connected to a concrete 
project or result in an informational harm.304 
 The Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform Act (Ap-
peals Reform Act) requires the Secretary of Agriculture, acting through 
the U.S. Forest Service (Forest Service), to create notice and comment 
procedures for proposed actions related to “projects and activities im-
plementing land and resource management plans.”305 Additionally, the 
Appeals Reform Act compels the Secretary to adjust the appeals proc-
ess for decisions regarding such projects.306 In 2003, the Forest Service 
restricted, through its regulations, the range and accessibility of its no-
tice, comment, and appeals procedures under the Appeals Reform 
Act.307 Various environmental organizations, including The Wilderness 
Society (TWS), filed facial challenges to three portions of the new regu-
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lations.308 Specifically, TWS alleged the regulations violated the Appeals 
Reform Act by inappropriately restricting the notice, comment, and 
appeals processes.309 In 2006, the court ruled in favor of TWS and 
granted it declaratory and injunctive relief.310 
 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the government argued the plain-
tiffs did not have standing because of Summers.311 The trial court, prior 
to the Summers decision, found that TWS’s deprivation of right to notice 
and comment was an injury giving rise to procedural standing.312 The 
court also held that TWS had standing because the Forest Service’s 
withholding of notice regarding its actions constituted an informa-
tional injury.313 On appeal, the Forest Service argued the plaintiffs 
lacked procedural standing in light of Summers’s holding that mere de-
nial of a procedural right without an additional harm is inadequate for 
standing.314 Moreover, the Forest Service contended that 36 C.F.R. sec-
tion 215.20(b) remedied the informational injuries upon which plain-
tiffs claimed standing.315 
 In response to the government’s argument that the Summers deci-
sion narrowed standing law, the plaintiffs made two separate arguments 
depending upon the regulation at issue.316 Regarding its challenge to 
section 215.12(f),317 TWS argued it had standing because it tied the 
challenge to a particular project at a specific location, and one of its 
members suffered an aesthetic or recreational injury cognizable pursu-
ant to the Supreme Court’s Laidlaw decision.318 By contrast, while TWS 
acknowledged it did not connect its challenges to sections 215.20(b) 
and 215.13(a) to a particular project or application, they argued that 
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Summers did not govern because it did not define informational in-
jury.319 Additionally, TWS asserted a broader theory of informational 
injury from its inability to participate in the notice and comment proc-
ess, as well as the Forest Service’s procedure for appeal and decision-
making.320 The Ninth Circuit observed that if it accepted TWS’s 
broader approach to informational standing then the Forest Service’s 
standing challenge would fail for each of the three regulations.321 
 The Ninth Circuit concluded that TWS failed to prove that its 
member suffered recreational and aesthetic injuries sufficient to chal-
lenge section 215.12(f).322 The court acknowledged that Summers did 
not eliminate standing for aesthetic and recreational injuries.323 How-
ever, the Ninth Circuit explained that proving an aesthetic or recrea-
tional injury required the plaintiffs to demonstrate that it’s member 
(Anderson) “had repeatedly visited an area affected by a project, that 
he had concrete plans to do so again, and that his recreational or aes-
thetic interests would be harmed if the project went forward without 
his having the opportunity to appeal.”324 Although Anderson demon-
strated he repeatedly visited the Umpqua National Forest and even au-
thored a hiking book about the area, the court concluded that his gen-
eral intention to return to the national forest was too vague to confer 
standing.325 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found the asserted interest 
vague because, even if Anderson planned travel to the Umpqua Na-
tional Forest in the future, he had not shown sufficient evidence that 
he would likely visit an area affected by the Forest Service’s projects.326 
Even if Anderson established sufficiently concrete plans to return to 
the forest, he failed to allege that his recreational interests would be 
harmed.327 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that TWS failed to dem-
onstrate a recreational or aesthetic injury to Anderson sufficient to es-
tablish standing to challenge section 215.12(f).328 
 Most importantly for the purposes of this Article, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that Summers foreclosed TWS’s broad theory of informa-
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tional standing.329 Prior to the Summers decision, the trial court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs suffered an informational injury because the 
Forest Service’s regulations foreclosed their opportunity to comment 
and appeal, and they “need not assert that any specific injury will occur 
in any specific national forest that their members visit.”330 TWS ac-
knowledged that because Summers “expressly held that deprivation of 
procedural rights, alone, cannot confer Article III standing,”331 the trial 
court’s reasoning was no longer valid.332 On appeal, TWS relied on “the 
district court’s finding that it suffered informational injury resulting 
from the violation of the obligation to provide notice” pursuant to sec-
tion 215.20(b),333 which exempted decisions of the Secretary and Un-
der Secretary of Agriculture from otherwise applicable notice require-
ments.334 Furthermore, TWS argued a broader theory of informational 
injury based on its inability to appeal under each of the three Forest 
Service provisions.335 The Ninth Circuit rejected TWS’s informational 
standing arguments because it concluded that Summers’s “discussion of 
procedural injury casts serious doubt on the applicability of informa-
tional injury here,”336 although the Supreme Court had not expressly 
addressed that issue.337 Because the Appeals Reform Act provides a spe-
cific right to information similar to FOIA, the Ninth Circuit was “not 
convinced that the doctrine of informational injury can be applied to 
the statutory framework of the [Appeals Reform Act], regardless of the 
specific provision.”338 
 After reviewing Akins and other decisions supporting informa-
tional standing, the Ninth Circuit observed that the Appeals Reform 
Act “must grant a right to information capable of supporting a lawsuit” 
in order to obtain standing for an informational injury.339 The court 
then demonstrated that the notice and appeal provisions in the Ap-
peals Reform Act did not establish a public right to information, but 
instead simply bestowed a right to participate in the process.340 Addi-
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tionally, the court clarified that “although an appeal might result in the 
dissemination of otherwise unavailable information, the statute does 
not contemplate appeals for this purpose, but to allow the public an 
opportunity to challenge proposals with which they disagree.”341 Ac-
cordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that although the rights to pub-
lic notice and appeal inherently provide access to information, this is 
not the same as a right to information.342 
 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
Bensman v. United States Forest Service,343 which “declined to find an ex-
plicit right to information in the text of the [Appeals Reform Act].”344 
Bensman distinguished the informational statutes at issue from the Ap-
peals Reform Act.345 According to Bensman, FOIA and FACA are stat-
utes with the sole goal of providing information to the public.346 Con-
versely, the goal in the Appeals Reform Act is “to increase public par-
ticipation in the decision-making process” and as a result, the court 
found that the Appeals Reform Act does not provide the same right to 
information.347 Although the Bensman decision only addressed whether 
the appeal provisions of the Appeals Reform Act established a right to 
information, the Ninth Circuit in Wilderness Society found the Seventh 
Circuit’s analysis “equally applicable” in concluding that Congress did 
not intend to provide a right to information when it enacted the Ap-
peals Reform Act’s notice requirement.348 
 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court’s 
Summers decision to implicitly bar the Wilderness Society’s plaintiffs’ 
broad theory of informational standing.349 The Ninth Circuit reasoned 
that TWS’s determination of informational injuries would effectively 
eliminate Summers’s core tenet that procedural rights plaintiffs must 
demonstrate a concrete injury apart from their procedural injury.350 
One of the main difficulties the Ninth Circuit had with TWS’s argu-
ment was that it characterized all procedural deprivations as informa-
tional losses.351 If this argument were adopted, the Ninth Circuit be-
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lieved that it would render Summers’s procedural injury doctrine mean-
ingless.352 The Ninth Circuit, therefore, refused to use the theory of 
informational injury in the framework of procedural rights as recog-
nized in the Appeals Reform Act.353 Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Wilder-
ness Society limited informational standing to statutes that explicitly cre-
ate a public right to information, and rejected the concept of informa-
tional injury for environmental statutes that merely encourage public 
participation through notice or appeal provisions.354 
V. Congress’s Authority to Authorize Informational Standing: 
A Vindication of Justice Kennedy? 
 Informational standing is a statutory creation, such as in the Free-
dom of Information Act, that establishes a public right to informa-
tion.355 There is no common law analog to informational standing.356 
Thus, two questions arise. First, are there any constitutional barriers to 
Congress creating informational standing rights? Second, assuming 
Congress has some authority to establish informational standing, how 
clearly must Congress specify whether a plaintiff has a right to particu-
lar information? 
 Justice Kennedy was the only justice to join the majority in Lujan, 
Summers, and Akins;357 therefore, any attempt to find a consistent line of 
reasoning in those cases must begin and end with Justice Kennedy.358 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lujan offers the most insight 
into whether Congress may, through statutory rights, recognize injuries 
that would not have satisfied common law requirements.359 This opin-
ion may enlarge, albeit marginally, the definition of concrete injury 
under Article III standing requirements.360 One may arguably infer 
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from Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinions in Lujan and Summers, as 
well as the Akins decision, that the Supreme Court is likely to give some 
deference to Congress if it establishes an explicit public right to infor-
mation along with a relevant citizen suit provision.361 At the same time, 
however, courts are less likely to interpret notice or appeal provisions 
like those in Wilderness Society to establish an implicit right to informa-
tional standing. 
A. To What Extent May Congress Affect Constitutional Standing 
Requirements? 
 There has been considerable confusion and controversy regarding 
the extent to which Congress may enact statutes that recognize injuries 
that would not have satisfied common law requirements.362 This contro-
versy extends to whether Congress may even enlarge the definition of 
concrete injury under Article III constitutional standing require-
ments.363 Justice Scalia has argued that Article III and broader separa-
tion of powers principles limit the authority of Congress to grant stand-
ing to plaintiffs who lack a concrete injury.364 This would prevent fed-
eral courts from interfering with the President’s Article II authority to 
enforce federal laws.365 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia in Lujan acknowl-
edged that Congress may “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable 
injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in 
law.”366 Justice Blackmun and many commentators have argued that Jus-
tice Scalia’s approach to standing, however, has the practical effect of 
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aggrandizing executive authority and undermining Congress’s ability to 
ensure that the executive branch faithfully enforces the law.367 Some 
commentators have sought a middle ground that respects both the ex-
ecutive and congressional role in making and enforcing federal law, as 
well as a limited but appropriate role for judicial review.368 Justice Ken-
nedy’s concurring opinion in Lujan suggests that he may take such a 
position with respect to Congress’s authority to modify standing re-
quirements beyond traditional common law requirements for a con-
rete
all plaintiffs in federal courts to demonstrate an injury in fact even if 
                                                                                                                     
c  injury.369 
 The Supreme Court’s analysis of whether Congress has the author-
ity to transcend traditional common law injuries, or even normal con-
stitutional standing requirements, depends in part upon the type of 
statute at issue.370 Based on parallels to common law traditions in Eng-
land and early American federal statutes, the Court has recognized 
standing where a statute authorizes private persons to bring suit on be-
half or as an agent of the United States.371 By contrast, the Court in 
Lujan limited standing for a citizen suit statute that authorized any per-
son to sue the government for alleged non-enforcement or under-
enforcement of an environmental law, finding that Article III requires 
 
367 Id. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the “principal effect” of Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion’s restrictive approach to standing was “to transfer power into the 
hands of the Executive at the expense—not of the Courts—but of Congress, from which 
that power originates and emanates”); see Brown, supra note 13, at 283; Elliott, supra note 
44, at 489–90; Solimine, supra note 13, at 1050 (“With respect to the argument that a broad 
reading of Article III standing improperly limits executive power under Article II, some 
scholars contend that it does not give sufficient weight to the balance, as opposed to the 
separation, of powers.”). 
368 Solimine, supra note 13, at 1052. Professor Solimine contends that liberal and con-
servative critiques both have persuasive arguments that can be reconciled. Id. “The liberal 
critique enhances the power of the judiciary and that of private parties empowered by 
Congress, at the expense of representative government in general and of the executive 
branch in particular.” Id. Conversely, “[t]he conservative critique enhances the power of 
the President and in theory encourages Congress to exercise its nondelegable oversight 
and appropriations functions, at the expense of giving space for the executive branch to 
underenforce or violate federal law.” Id. 
369 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
370 Id. at 576–77 (majority opinion) (discussing whether a specific statute conveys 
standing); id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(discussing Congress’s power to define injuries in statutes). 
371 See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773–78 
(2000) (discussing historical background and upholding qui tam statute that offered a 
bounty to a prevailing plaintiff); Solimine, supra note 13, at 1037–41 (discussing contro-
versy over whether early qui tam statutes are precedent to allow standing where citizen acts 
as agent of government). 
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Congress attempts to waive that requirement.372 Conversely, Akins im-
plies that Congress has the authority to broaden standing require-
ments, at least for statutes giving the public the right to sue to obtain 
information from the government.373 It is also important to observe 
that Congress frequently wants to limit standing beyond the base limits 
of Article III in order to prevent persons with minimal injuries from 
filing suit.374 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has used the “zone of 
interests” test to deny standing to plaintiffs whose injuries are only mar-
ginally related to a statute’s purposes.375 
 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lujan is probably the 
most illuminating opinion regarding the authority of Congress to mod-
ify common law injury requirements, or even constitutional standing 
requirements, for a concrete injury. Justice Kennedy agreed with the 
majority that a plaintiff must demonstrate a concrete injury and that 
the affiants had failed to do so because they were uncertain as to when 
they would return to the project sites.376 He suggested, however, that 
“[a]s Government programs and policies become more complex and 
farreaching,” courts should perhaps expand the definition of a con-
crete injury to include new rights of action that do not correlate to 
rights recognized traditionally in common law.377 Justice Kennedy rea-
soned that “Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate 
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where 
none existed before.”378 He tempered that broad pronouncement of 
congressional authority with the reservation that “[i]n exercising this 
power, however, Congress must at the very least identify the injury it 
seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled 
to bring suit.”379 
                                                                                                                      
372 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578; Solimine, supra note 13, at 1028–30. 
373 See Akins, 524 U.S. at 19–20; Solimine, supra note 13, at 1050 (“FEC v. Akins, seem[s] 
to evince a more generous reading of congressional power to influence standing.”). 
374 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 131 S. Ct. 863, 869–70 (2011) (concluding Title VII’s 
limitation of suits to a “person claiming to be aggrieved” under 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-
5(f) includes individual allegedly fired in retaliation for his fiancée’s filing employment 
discrimination suit, but not to stockholder who might be marginally economically affected 
by alleged discrimination and who would meet Article III injury requirement). 
375 Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987) (explaining that the “zone of 
interests” test denies review “if the plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or in-
consistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed 
that Congress intended to permit the suit”). 
376 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579. 
377 See id. at 580. 
378 Id. 
379 Id. 
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 While proclaiming that Congress had some discretionary authority 
to expand the definition of injuries beyond common law limits, Justice 
Kennedy acknowledged that separation of powers concerns place limits 
on the scope of standing.380 In particular, he observed that “the re-
quirement of concrete injury confines the Judicial Branch to its proper, 
limited role in the constitutional framework of Government.”381 In 
Lujan, Justice Kennedy concluded that the citizen suit provision of the 
Endangered Species Act was problematic to the extent that it pur-
ported to extend standing to “any person,” but did not define what type 
of injury is caused to citizen litigants by the government’s violation of 
the Act or explain why “any person” is entitled to sue the government 
to challenge a procedural violation that does not cause a concrete in-
jury in fact to the plaintiff.382 Justice Kennedy believed that the con-
crete injury requirement is not just a formality; rather, it ensures the 
continuance of the adversarial process by necessitating that both parties 
have a stake in the outcome.383 Therefore, “the legal questions pre-
sented . . . will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating 
society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appre-
ciation of the consequences of judicial action.”384 
 Justice Kennedy’s argument in Lujan is consistent with the Court’s 
subsequent decision in Akins—that it would deny standing for general-
ized injuries if the harm is both widely shared and also of “an abstract 
and indefinite nature—for example, harm to the ‘common concern for 
obedience to law.’”385 Thus, it was arguably consistent for Justices Ken-
nedy and Souter to concur as they did in Lujan and join the majority 
opinion in Akins.386 In his short concurring opinion in Summers, Justice 
                                                                                                                      
380 See id. at 580–81. 
381 Id. at 581. 
382 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
383 Id. at 581. 
384 Id. 
385 See Akins, 524 U.S. at 23 (quoting L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R. Co., 311 U.S. 
295, 303 (1940)); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment) (stating that a plaintiff must have a concrete injury to have standing, 
that a mere interest in the proper administration of justice is insufficient for standing, and 
that there is no numerical limit on how many persons may be concretely injured by a chal-
lenged action). 
386 See Akins, 524 U.S. at 13 (listing Justices Kennedy and Souter as joining the majority 
opinion); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
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Kennedy echoed his views from his Lujan concurrence and, therefore, 
it seems likely that his views have not significantly changed.387 
 Justice Kennedy rejected standing in Lujan and Summers in part 
because Congress had not defined what constituted an injury sufficient 
for standing in the relevant statutes.388 He suggested, however, that the 
plaintiffs’ injuries might have been sufficient if Congress had estab-
lished a statutory framework consistent with those injuries.389 By con-
trast, Justice Scalia’s majority opinions in Lujan and Summers ridiculed 
the plaintiffs’ injuries as constitutionally deficient because the plaintiffs 
could not specify when or where they would be injured.390 It is doubtful 
that a more carefully drafted statute in either case would have per-
suaded Justice Scalia that the plaintiffs had constitutionally cognizable 
injuries.391 In his Akins dissent, Justice Scalia argued that generalized 
injuries to a large portion of the public are inherently unsuitable for 
judicial resolution, and must be addressed by the political branches of 
government.392 On the other hand, Justice Kennedy joined the major-
ity opinion in Akins, which concluded that generalized grievances to a 
large segment of the public are justiciable if Congress specifies that a 
class of individuals has the right to particular information or if a large 
group of individuals suffers at least a small concrete harm.393 In light of 
Akins and his concurring opinions in Lujan and Summers, Justice Ken-
nedy appears to believe that Congress has some power to define or re-
define what constitutes a cognizable concrete injury under Article III, 
although Congress may not confer universal standing without defining 
the requisite injury.394 
B. How Clearly Must Congress Specify Whether a Plaintiff Has a Right to 
Particular Information? 
 While many individual statutes affect standing questions, Congress 
rarely attempts to enact comprehensive legislation that would signifi-
cantly affect standing doctrine or the jurisdiction of Article III 
                                                                                                                      
387 See supra notes 177–181 and accompanying text. 
388 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); supra notes 177–181 and accompanying text. 
389 See supra notes 177–181 and accompanying text. 
390 See Summers, 555 U.S. at 495; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563–64. 
391 See Solimine, supra note 13, at 1049 (arguing that Justice Scalia and Chief Justice 
Roberts believe that “Congress cannot tinker with the core constitutional standing re-
quirements, though it might relax the prudential ones”). 
392 See Akins, 524 U.S. at 30, 36–37 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
393 See id. at 13, 24–25 (majority opinion). 
394 See Solimine, supra note 13, at 1050. 
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courts.395 In reaction to several restrictive standing decisions by the Su-
preme Court in the 1970s, some liberal Democratic members of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee introduced legislation that would have 
broadly defined both who may sue and the causation requirement; 
however, none of the proposed legislation was enacted.396 Some com-
mentators have suggested that federal courts would seriously question 
the constitutionality of congressional statutes that broaden standing 
and thereby partially overrule restrictive Supreme Court decisions.397 
Nevertheless, federal courts frequently, if not always, give some weight 
to legislative intent in determining the standing of potential plain-
tiffs.398 
 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lujan reveals how the 
Court is likely to evaluate Congress’s authority to modify the concrete 
injury requirement for standing.399 His opinion suggests that he would 
defer to congressional intentions if Congress carefully drafted a statute 
that explains which individuals are suitable plaintiffs and which types of 
harms constitute a sufficient injury for standing.400 In response to Jus-
tice Kennedy’s opinions, Professor Solimine asked a critical standing 
question: “How do we know a statute meets Justice Kennedy’s test?”401 
To address this question, the statutory text, structure, and legislative 
history will have to be closely examined.402 Relying on Justice Ken-
nedy’s approach to standing in Lujan, Professor Solimine argues that 
the Court’s decisions in Lujan and Akins “seem more reconcilable than 
thought by some scholars, given that the citizen suit statute in the latter 
                                                                                                                      
395 See id. at 1052. 
396 Id. at 1052–53; see also Larry W. Yackle, Reclaiming the Federal Courts 66, 82–
88 (1994) (discussing the positive and negative aspects of proposed legislation to expand 
standing rights as well as how legislation should ideally be phrased). 
397 See Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 159, 
190–92, 226 (2011) (questioning whether the Supreme Court would allow Congress to 
modify standing doctrine and whether congressional efforts would improve problems with 
the standing doctrine). 
398 See Solimine, supra note 13, at 1053–56 (arguing that while federal courts should 
give some deference to Congress in deciding standing issues, they should not abdicate 
judicial responsibility to limit congressional authority if necessary). 
399 See supra notes 362–394 and accompanying text. 
400 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580; Solimine, supra note 13, at 1055 (discussing “Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in [Lujan], which suggested that carefully drawn congres-
sional statutes addressing standing should be upheld as constitutional”). 
401 See Solimine, supra note 13, at 1055 (footnote omitted). 
402 Id. 
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case had different language and a richer jurisprudential meaning giv-
ing context to the operative language.”403 
 Another principle that may guide the Court in interpreting the 
scope of statutory standing rights is that Congress may override the 
Court’s prudential standing rules, provided the statute does so ex-
pressly.404 This requirement probably does not necessitate the level of 
specificity required by the clear statement rule of statutory construc-
tion.405 The principle that express statutory language is necessary to 
override the Court’s prudential standing rules could be extended to 
suggest that Congress may enlarge Article III standing rights at the 
margin by, for example, expressly establishing a statutory injury not 
recognized at common law.406 
 An important question for this Article is whether the environ-
mental statutes at issue in American Canoe and Wilderness Society are more 
like the citizen suit statute in Lujan or the explicit information statute in 
Akins.407 The notice and appeal provisions in Wilderness Society and the 
monitoring and reporting obligations in American Canoe are more like 
the vague “any person” language in Lujan than the explicit public in-
formation statute at issue in Akins.408 Because the Akins decision found 
informational standing rights in a statute that clearly granted voters an 
                                                                                                                      
403 See id. at 1056. In a footnote, Professor Solimine observes, “[i]t also cannot go un-
noticed that Justice Kennedy concurred in both cases, and even Justice Scalia, dissenting 
in Akins, did not argue that the majority was overruling Lujan.” Id. at 1056 n.182. While 
Lujan and Akins can be reconciled to some extent in light of Justice Kennedy’s support in 
both cases, it is significant that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan expressed signifi-
cant reservations with Justice Scalia’s majority opinion. See supra notes 388–394 and ac-
companying text. Justice Scalia clearly believed that the Akins majority opinion was phi-
losophically at odds with his view of standing as an essential component of separation of 
powers principles that he had articulated in Lujan and in his 1983 law review article. See 
supra notes 145–150 and accompanying text. 
404 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162–63 (1997). 
405 See Yackle, supra note 12, at 386 n.489 (commenting that the Court often inter-
prets section 702 of the APA, which gives standing to those within the zone of interests, 
based on precedent construing that section rather than the strict statutory text). 
406 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
407 See Akins, 524 U.S. at 13 (discussing a group of voters challenging the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 557–58 (discussing a challenge to a rule promul-
gated under the Endangered Species Act); Wilderness Soc’y, 622 F.3d at 1253 (discussing 
challenge to the Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform Act); Am. Canoe, 389 
F.3d at 538 (discussing violations of the Clean Water Act). 
408 See Akins, 524 U.S. at 20; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (discussing that the Endangered Species Act does not estab-
lish an injury in “any person” when the statute is violated); Wilderness Soc’y, 622 F.3d at 
1259; Am. Canoe, 389 F.3d at 539. 
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affirmative right to information,409 the Ninth Circuit in Wilderness Society 
was probably correct to conclude that Congress must be explicit in 
granting the public the right to certain information if it intends to cre-
ate an informational injury and informational standing.410 While giving 
plaintiffs informational standing might assist Congress in enforcing no-
tice and appeal provisions, it was not unreasonable for the Ninth Circuit 
to require more explicit rights conferring language when determining 
whether plaintiffs have Article III standing.411 Based on his concurring 
opinions in Lujan and Summers, both of which demanded that Congress 
more explicitly define the injuries for citizen suit standing, Justice Ken-
nedy probably would have agreed with the Wilderness Society decision.412 
The decision suggested that Congress must use explicit language to es-
tablish public informational standing rights and that general notice and 
appeal provisions in a statute designed to promote public participation 
do not create a right to informational standing.413 As a result, Justice 
Kennedy probably would have disagreed with the majority in American 
Canoe, which held that the monitoring and public information require-
ments in the Clean Water Act are sufficiently clear to demonstrate that 
Congress intended to create a public right to information establishing 
standing rights.414 Instead, Justice Kennedy would have likely agreed 
with Sixth Circuit Judge Kennedy’s dissenting view that only explicit 
congressional authorization can confer informational standing rights.415 
Conclusion 
 In its recent Wilderness Society decision, the Ninth Circuit addressed 
the difficult question of when a statute may establish a right to informa-
                                                                                                                      
409 See Akins, 524 U.S. at 24–25. 
410 See Wilderness Soc’y, 622 F.3d at 1259. 
411 See id. at 1258–60. 
412 See Summers, 555 U.S. at 500 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment); Wilderness Soc’y, 622 F.3d at 1259. 
413 See supra notes 300–394 and accompanying text. 
414 Compare Wilderness Soc’y, 622 F.3d at 1259 (holding that Congress’s purpose for the 
statute was not to create a right to information but to allow public opportunity for com-
ment), with Am. Canoe, 389 F.3d at 542 (holding that lack of information caused an injury 
“beyond common concern for obedience to law” and therefore established an injury suffi-
cient for standing). 
415 See Am. Canoe, 389 F.3d at 550 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part); supra notes 177–181, 362–394 and accompa-
nying text. 
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tional standing.416 The D.C. Circuit and the Sixth Circuit previously 
reached different conclusions about whether environmental statutes 
promoting public participation or requiring environmental assessments 
create a right to informational standing.417 The Sixth Circuit broadly 
interpreted informational standing requirements by relying upon 
Akins, even though the rights provided in the Clean Water Act differed 
from the statute at issue in Akins.418 By contrast, in Wilderness Society, the 
Ninth Circuit interpreted Summers’s narrowing of procedural rights 
standing as implicitly narrowing standing rights in general, and con-
cluded that general notice and appeal provisions that do not establish 
an explicit informational right are insufficient to establish informa-
tional standing.419 
 The Wilderness Society decision and the American Canoe decision indi-
rectly raise the broader question of when Congress may modify com-
mon law injury, or even Article III constitutional standing, requirements 
for a concrete injury.420 In turn, that question raises broader separation 
of powers issues.421 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lujan, 
which he recently echoed in his concurring opinion in Summers,422 
represents the ideological middle ground on this issue.423 His vote is 
likely to be the key vote in future cases unless the Court’s current ideo-
logical composition changes.424 Since both his concurring opinions in 
Lujan and in Summers sought explicit congressional language defining 
types of injuries sufficient for standing, it is also likely that Justice Ken-
nedy would demand explicit language defining informational inju-
ries.425 Thus, he would likely agree with the Ninth Circuit in Wilderness 
Society that general language establishing appeal and notice rights is in-
sufficient to create a public right to information, unlike the explicit 
                                                                                                                      
416 See Wilderness Soc’y, 622 F.3d at 1259–60; supra notes 300–354 and accompanying 
text. 
417 Compare supra notes 200–237 and accompanying text (examining the D.C. Circuit’s 
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es.434 
                                                                                                                     
rights-conferring language at issue in Akins.426 Because he typically de-
mands explicit language from Congress to modify traditional common 
law standing requirements for a concrete injury, Justice Kennedy proba-
bly would have agreed with Judge Kennedy’s dissenting opinion in 
American Canoe.427 
 While the decision in Wilderness Society relied on the implications of 
Summers to limit Akins and informational standing, the Ninth Circuit 
would have been better advised to examine Justice Kennedy’s concur-
ring opinions in Lujan and Summers as a guide to the Supreme Court’s 
approach to when Congress may confer standing rights.428 According to 
Justice Kennedy, Congress has some discretion to establish standing 
rights beyond traditional common law standing requirements for a con-
crete injury as long as it carefully defines the injury and the class of per-
sons entitled to sue.429 Justice Kennedy, however, also recognized that 
Article III limits Congress’s authority to grant standing to “any person” 
to challenge the government’s failure to observe its legal obligations.430 
 While its decision in Wilderness Society was a defeat for environ-
mental groups seeking to expand informational standing rights, the 
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning left open the possibility that Congress could 
explicitly grant informational standing rights to the public, as it did in 
Public Citizen and Akins. 431 The Ninth Circuit reached the right result 
in requiring explicit congressional authorization for informational 
standing, even though it should have focused on Justice Kennedy’s ap-
proach to standing rights instead of Justice Scalia’s. 432 Despite Justice 
Scalia’s philosophical reservations about citizen suit statutes and con-
gressional interference with the executive branch’s Article II author-
ity,433 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinions in Lujan and Summers sug-
gest that Congress has significant authority to expand citizen suit stand-
ing as long as it carefully defines the statutory injuri
 
426 See supra notes 300–415 and accompanying text. 
427 See supra notes 177–181, 238–299, 407–415 and accompanying text. 
428 See supra notes 362–415 and accompanying text. 
429 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); supra notes 362–394 and accompanying text. 
430 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); supra notes 362–394 and accompanying text. 
431 See Wilderness Soc’y, 622 F.3d at 1259 (discussing that Congress chose not to confer a 
right to information, while leaving open the possibility that such a right could be con-
ferred); supra notes 93–150, 300–354 and accompanying text. 
432 See supra notes 304–358, 395–415 and accompanying text. 
433 See supra notes 145–150 and accompanying text. 
434 See supra notes 362–415 and accompanying text. 
